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The dissertation examines factors influencing nonprofit organizations’ contribution to 
collaborative governance for climate change adaptation and nonprofit roles in the 
collaboration. Why an organization collaborates with others has long been a concern of 
scholars. However, in a majority of empirical studies, collaboration has been considered as a 
dichotomous concept. To fill the gap, this study considers organizations’ contribution to 
collaboration, i.e., collaboration level in terms of power, joint activities, human resource, 
funding, and information sharing. To understand contribution of nonprofits to collaboration for 
climate change adaptation, this research employs the institutional collective action framework 
suggesting that organizations work together when expected benefits are greater than 
collaborative risks. Survey data from 101 nonprofit private organizations (beyoungri mingan 
danche) in South Korea, which are legally defined in the Assistance for Nonprofit, 
Nongovernmental Organizations Act, are analyzed. Finding is that government funding and 
social relationship are strongly associated with nonprofit contribution to collaboration, 
highlighting that the financial stability of nonprofit organizations and mutual trust among 
entities based on routine interaction are critical motives for nonprofit collaboration. Finding 
also reveals that Korean nonprofits mainly play a role as social capital creators in climate 
change adaptation. The finding also highlights that Sang Bu Sang Jo (相扶相助) among 
community members is a key concept to encourage nonprofit engagement in climate change 
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Climate change issue is a global collective action problem because solving the problem 
involves major participants regardless of borders to make coordinated efforts to reduce 
greenhouse gas emission (Sandler, 2004). Threats due to climate change are the cumulative 
result of multiple entities such as individuals, groups, and countries, and thus requiring global 
solutions at the international level (Ostrom, 2010). Not only countries who are responsible for 
global warming but also ones not responsible are exposed to negative externalities of climate 
change. Actions agreed upon at the global level are necessary to reduce climate change 
impacts. 
Based on Ostrom (2010), collective action is a “settings where decisions about costly 
actions are made independently but outcomes jointly affect everyone involved (p.551).” In the 
same vein, Sandler (2004) argues that collective action requires strategic interactions where 
choices and the effects of the choices influence not only one's own actions but also the actions 
of others. Participation in the global effort to reduce greenhouse gas emission is determined 
depending on political and economic situations of each actors (i.e., country, municipalities, 
groups, and individuals), but positive externalities of greenhouse gas reduction are not 
constrained within the boundaries of participants. One argument is that if a goal of the Paris 
Agreement is achieved, the limitation of temperature rise is applied to the world rather than to 
only participants.  
As a representative type of collective action dilemma, there have been controversies 
about climate change issues. Climate change generates profound unfairness between those 
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who incur climate change and those who are most negatively influenced by it (Huq et al., 2007). 
More specifically, in terms of individual, while advantaged groups tend to contribute most to 
climate change with a life pattern of high-energy consumption, the disadvantaged groups with 
least consumed energy are most at risk. Likewise, at the level of country, developed countries 
most emit greenhouse gas, catalyzing climate change, but underdeveloped countries most bear 
costs in terms of damages.  
Due to the uncertainty and externalities of climate change effects on the world, 
adaption of climate change requires joint actions among governments, private and nonprofit 
sectors. To achieve common goals, an effective mitigation of climate change effects by reducing 
greenhouse gas emission, multiple entities establish partnerships and comply with the formal 
and informal agreements. Importance of multiple governance at different scales in coping with 
climate change has been emphasized (Ostrom, 2010). The polycentric approach to climate 
change adaptation includes from a household action throughout an international collaboration.  
However, engagement in climate change adaptation is limited due to non-excludability 
of the collective benefits. Based on the conventional collective action theory, no one will 
voluntarily engage in the actions for climate change adaption without institutions preventing 
free-riding and shirking (Prakash & Potoski, 2007). For example, withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement results in no penalty. Moreover, there are no formal authorities over the 
participating countries to meet the proposed target temperature. 
Climate change issues are associated with various policy areas such as environment, 
disaster management, energy, public health, agriculture, etc. Especially, from the disaster risk 
reduction perspective, climate change adaptation is critical since climate change is a key factor 
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that leads an increase of disaster risks (Forino et al., 2015). Moreover, disaster risk reduction 
measures can function as climate change adaptation measures (or vice versa). Precipitation has 
been anticipated to be more intense and frequent, resulting in flooding of low-level areas. An 
increase of melted ice due to global warming is directly associated with rising sea level, and 
thus exacerbating shoreline erosion and water salinization. Especially, underdeveloped 
countries are more severely affected than the developed ones. Sea level rise is critical to island 
countries. According to UNISDR (UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction), $2.245 trillion of direct 
economic losses due to extreme weather events was reported between 1998 and 2017. It 
presents a big rise compared with losses during the previous two decades, $895 billion, 
representing the increasing threat of climate change (United Nations, 2018).  
Climate change is also influential to the natural ecosystem. The Everglades in South 
Florida represent aquatic and territorial ecosystems that are threatened by rising sea level 
resulted from climate change. The anticipated risks from climate change, such as sea level rise, 
drought, and high temperature, endanger aquatic habitat, and eventually endanger territorial 
animals that rely on plants and animals that inhabit estuaries, rivers, and marshes (Pearlstine et 
al., 2010). 
1.1 Collaboration in Climate Change Adaptation 
1.1.1 International Approach to Collaborative Governance for Climate Change Adaptation 
As a part of collaborative governance at the international level for mitigating climate 
change impacts, international agreements have been adopted (Kelman, 2015). For example, the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is an international treaty 
adopted in 1992, aiming to prevent anthropogenic interference with environment by 
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constraining greenhouse gas emission. Within the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 
1997, calling for limiting greenhouse gas emission of industrialized countries for the first time 
(Breidenich et al., 1998). Also, the Paris Agreement, a legally binding treaty prescribing each 
member country must set a goal of CO2 reduction, was adopted in 2015 (UNFCCC, 2016). 
Important collaborative governance for climate change adaptation also can be found 
through the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). As a part of an international strategy for 
reducing disaster risks caused by climate change, it was adopted by the UN World Conference 
for Disaster Reduction in 2005 for the period of 2005 through 2015. The HFA calls for building 
resilience of nation through communities with a focus on identifying risks, enhancing early 
warning, and sharing knowledge (UNISDR, 2005). 
The HFA has been extended to the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-
2030 as a successive global strategy for disaster risk reduction. The Sendai Framework is one of 
the major agreements of the post 2015 development agenda, highlighting the significance of 
collaborative governance among all stakeholders including all levels of governments, public 
agencies, nonprofits, private sectors, etc. (UNISDR, 2015).   
Another global agreement of the post 2015, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
was ratified by countries at UN Summit of 2015. The SDGs were voluntarily set as a successor to 
the Millennium Development Goals for the purpose of seeking for sustainable development, 
while tackling climate change (United Nations, 2020). These long-term agreements identify 
potential risks resulted from climate change and suggest adaptation or mitigation strategies for 
climate change impacts. 
However, there has been debates regarding climate change adaption at international 
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level. Developing countries posit that developed counties are primarily responsible for current 
global warming. Thus, they are reluctant to bear equal burdens for reducing greenhouse gas 
emission (Ostrom, 2010). 
1.1.2 U.S. Approach to Collaborative Governance of Climate Change Adaptation 
In the context of climate change, one of the major concerns is sea level rise (SLR). Based 
on the United States National Climate Assessment of 2012, SLR is expected to have significant 
impacts on the United States. More than eight-millions of people live in coastal communities, 
which are at risk of flooding. Many of national assets including military, business, energy, and 
ecosystem facilities are also located on the coast or in the ocean (NOAA, 2012). For example, 
sea level rise of a three-foot is expected to submerge more than a third of South Florida, 
threatening the 5.5 million of residents along the coast (Vella et al., 2016). 
The accelerated rate of sea level rise cannot be confidently estimated. The uncertainty is 
generated because we cannot clearly explain the influence of climate change mitigation 
strategies on global warming nor loss rates of Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets. 
Unpredictable effects of ground water pumping and water storage on sea level rise result in 
uncertainty of sea level rise as well. Another source of uncertainty is related to winds and ocean 
current, and salinity (Butler et al., 2016). Despite a difficulty of predicting SLR, it was estimated 
in 2012 that global mean sea level rise is between 0.2 and 2.0 meters by 2100.  
While sea level rise has been estimated at the international level, there is also a need to 
examine local distinctions when it comes to environment concerns.  Because rise of sea level 
varies highly across time and location along the coast, SLR-related decisions at local levels must 
take into account long-term environmental change. Local factors driving environmental change 
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must be considered as well (NOAA, 2012). For example, an identical amount of SLR has 
different influences on the regions, depending on the industry types (e.g., agriculture, fishing, 
and forestry) of the regions. 
Rising sea level results in problematic influences on coastal community. Sea level rise 
could make the function of drainage infrastructures weakened and exacerbate coastline 
erosion. Moreover, rising sea level could catalyze saltwater intrusion on coastal aquifer (e.g., 
the Biscayne Aquifer), threatening drinking water supply for the population of Southeast Florida 
(Butler et al., 2016). Inundation and storm surge flooding of coastal communities is also 
expected to happen more frequently as a result of rising sea level (Butler et al., 2016).  
The U.S. government has pursued climate change adaptation through legislation and 
finance. For the research of global warming-related issues, the Global Change Research Act was 
legislated in 1990. The Act mandates the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) to 
conduct the National Climate Assessment and to create a report every four years for Congress 
and the President (USGCRP, 2018). USGCRP assesses climate change impacts on various fields 
of the society such as environment, energy, land use, water resource, and human health. The 
research program also analyzes major trends in global change. The findings of the research 
serve as an information in decision-making of climate policies. The Climate Change Funding, a 
federal funding for research, adaptation, technology, and international aids for developing 
countries, has been operated as well since 1993. The Fund amounts to $11.6 billion as of 2014 
(GAO, 2019).  
Nationwide engagement of local governments in mitigating climate impact is 
exemplified by the U.S. Mayors’ Climate Protection Agreement (Mayors’ Agreement), which 
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was adopted on the 2005 U.S. Conference of Mayors. The Mayors’ Agreement promotes more 
than 1,000 municipalities across the nation to take actions for addressing problems induced by 
climate change and resolving the problems collectively. The national model of collaboration for 
climate adaptation has an effect of encouraging regional collaboration among municipalities. 
For example, the Mayors’ Climate Action Pledge of Southeast Region in Florida was promoted 
to be aligned with the U.S. Mayors’ Agreement, while advancing the national goals. 
However, climate change policies are not making progress, and are even declining for 
the reason of political economy. First, political fragmentation in climate change policies at 
national level are observed. American Republicans are reluctant to make regulatory climate 
policies because they are affiliated with industry (Bryner, 2008; McCright & Dunlap, 2003). As a 
representative example, the United States declared withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, 
receiving full support from the Republican Party but criticism from the Democrats. Also, climate 
change issue is not seriously considered by all states. Some vulnerable states to climate change 
are amenable to climate change policies, but others are not. Because many policies are created 
and implemented at the state level rather than at the federal level in the United States, 
national standards for CCA may not be appropriate for some states. 
1.2 Overview of the Study  
1.2.1 Objective and Research Questions 
The objective of this dissertation is to examine determinants of nonprofit contribution 
to collaborative governance for climate change adaptation and identify roles of nonprofit 
organizations in the collaborative governance. The research will be guided by the following 
questions:  
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(1) What factors explain nonprofit organizations’ contribution to collaborative 
governance for climate change adaptation?  
(2) What are the roles of nonprofits in collaborative governance for climate change 
adaptation? 
1.2.2 Scope of the Study 
To answer the questions, I examine interorganizational collaboration of Korean 
nonprofit organizations with other entities for climate change adaptation. To address nonprofit 
contribution to collaboration and roles in collaborative governance in the context of climate 
change adaptation, nonprofit private organizations (beyoungri mingan danche) in South Korea 
are observed. Nonprofit private organizations, which are legally defined in the Assistance for 
Nonprofit, Nongovernmental Organizations Act, are registered to a central administrative 
agency or a Metropolitan City/a Do (province level) and eligible for the government funding and 
other administrative supports. Basic information on the nonprofit private organizations is 
provided from the data set opened to the public by the Ministry of the Interior and Safety 
(MOIS) of Korea through the NPO Public Activity Support System. According to the MOIS, total 
14,713 organizations are registered as nonprofit private organizations (beyoungri mingan 
danche), as of 2019.  
Among 14,713 nonprofit private organizations, this study considers 1,468 organizations 
that are primarily involved in the following three service areas that are critical in climate change 
adaptation: (1) public safety and emergency management: disaster risk assessment, search and 
rescue, reliefs, rebuilding infrastructure, etc., (2) energy-related: energy saving (recycling) and 
new/renewable energy development, etc., and (3) natural resource conservation: conservation 
of species, nature conservation (river, ocean, and forest), etc. (Table 1.1). Category 1 includes 
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activities of disaster relief, search and rescue, disaster recovery. Korean Red Cross, Korea 
Disaster Relief Association, Marine Corps Friendship Association are representatively 
categorized into this category. Category 2 accounts for energy related activities for climate 
change adaptation, i.e., energy saving through recycling, development of new or renewable 
energy, etc. The category is exemplified by the nonprofit organizations such as Korea NGO’s 
Energy Network, Korea Resources Recycling Association, and Energy Justice Actions. 
Organizations under the category 3 engage in activities to conserve natural resources. The 
environment organizations like Korea Federation for Environmental Movements and Green 
Korea dominantly occupy this category. It should be noted that, despite the classification, many 
organizations are involved in more than one service area, most frequently, conservation of 
natural resources and energy saving (e.g., Korea Federation for Environmental Movement, 
Green Korea, Environment Action Association, etc.).  
Table 1.1: Scope of Nonprofits in the Study 
Service Areas Examples 
Category 1. Public safety and emergency 
management: disaster risk assessment, search 
and rescue, reliefs, rebuilding infrastructure, etc. 
• Korean Red Cross 
• Korea Disaster Relief Association 
• Marine Corps Friendship Association 
Category 2. Energy-related: energy saving 
(recycling) and new/renewable energy 
development, etc.  
• Korea NGO’s Energy Network  
• Korea Resources Recycling Association  
• Energy Justice Actions 
Category 3. Natural resource conservation: 
conservation of species, nature conservation 
(river, ocean, and forest), etc. 
• Korea Federation for Environmental 
Movements 
• Green Korea 
• Environment Action Association 
 
Relevant hypotheses are tested in the context of climate change adaptation through the 
ordinary least square regression. To examine nonprofit roles in collaborative governance, 
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Moulton and Eckerd’s (2012) typology is adopted (i.e., service provision, innovation, individual 
expression, political advocacy, citizen engagement, and social capital creation). Nonprofit roles 
in collaborative governance are descriptively analyzed, and it is finally identified that Korean 
nonprofit organizations play four roles of the service provision, innovation, political advocacy, 
and social capital creation. 
1.2.3 Theoretical and Practical Implications 
This study has theoretical and practical implications. First, this study contributes to the 
literature on interorganizational collaboration by considering contribution to collaboration. 
Despite abundant studies on collaboration among various entities, little research has addressed 
contribution to collaboration. This study provides insightful knowledge about 
interorganizational collaboration by considering actual contribution to achieving goals. This 
study also expands the institutional collective action framework to understanding the nonprofit 
roles in collaboration. Existing literature using the ICA framework focus on explaining 
collaboration decision-making. This research sheds light on identifying nonprofit roles in 
collaboration by making a new attempt to applying the ICA framework to the specific 
collaboration types (i.e., supplementary, complementary, and adversarial). Practically, 
categorized determinants of collaboration employed in this research strengthen nonprofit 
contribution in collaborative governance. Practitioners can make balanced strategies to 
promote nonprofits to effectively co-work with consideration of encompassing environmental 
factors (i.e., organizational, government, interorganizational, and community factors).   
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1.3 Organization of the Study 
Following Chapter 1, Chapter 2 provide theoretical frameworks and relevant hypotheses 
to identify determinants of the nonprofit contribution to collaboration. First, an overview of 
different theoretical frameworks explaining collaboration is provided, i.e., institutional 
collective action framework, resource dependence theory, and transaction cost theory. 
Through the comparison of strengths and weaknesses of the three theoretical frameworks, I 
suggest the Institutional Collective Action model of nonprofit collaboration. The institutional 
collective action (ICA) framework explains that nonprofit organizations collaborate with other 
entities when collaborative benefits (i.e., competitive advantages, service improvement, 
legitimacy, etc.) are greater than risks (i.e., mission drift, autonomy loss, bureaucratization, 
etc.). Then, to explain nonprofit contribution to collaboration, eight predictors under four 
categories are employed: (1) organizational factors (board size and collaborative capacity), (2) 
government factors (government funding and red tape), (3) interorganizational factors (social 
relationships and social learning), and (4) community factors (demographic diversity and 
community support). Finally, relevant hypotheses are generated. 
In the Chapter 3, I review three typologies of nonprofit roles to examine nonprofit roles 
in collaborative governance. Young (1999) suggests three nonprofit roles (i.e., supplements, 
complements, and adversaries) based on the relationship with the government. Frumkin (2002) 
intersects two dimensions of orientation (supply vs. demand) and rationale (expression vs. 
instrument), and then introduces four roles of service delivery, mobilization of civic and political 
engagement, social entrepreneurship, and expression of individual faith. Moulton and Eckerd 
(2012) further develop the work of Frumkin (2002), offering six types of nonprofit roles: service 
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provision, innovation, individual expression, political advocacy, citizen engagement, and social 
capital creation. With the comparison of strengths and weaknesses of the three classification, I 
adopt a typology suggested by Moulton and Eckerd. 
Chapter 4 outlines research design with the three parts. In the first part, I explain the 
research site. South Korea is threatened by various types of hazards such as typhoon, local 
heavy rain, sea level rise, and temperature rise. These hazards are expected to be more 
exacerbated due to the climate change (KMA, 2020). Especially, South Korea has a vulnerability 
to climate change originated from geographic factor, i.e., a peninsula surrounded by the sea on 
three sides (i.e., east, south, and west) of the country. Also, South Korea is appropriate to the 
study of collaboration for climate change adaptation in terms of providing a good practice of 
the nationwide collaborative governance. Next part describes a data collection process. Data is 
primarily collected through the survey. A data set opened to the public by the Ministry of the 
Interior and Safety of Korea is used, and survey samples are randomly selected from 1,468 
nonprofit organizations which are subject to the service areas of emergency management, 
energy saving and development, and natural resource conservation (see Table 1.1). Finally, 101 
nonprofit organizations participate in the survey (48.1% response rate). The third part describes 
the measurement of dependent and independent variables including survey instruments. 
In the following chapter (Chapter 5), results of statistical analyses are reported and 
discussed. The chapter is divided into two sections. One section lays out determinants of 
nonprofit contribution to collaboration for climate change adaptation. Through the ordinary 
least square regressions, it is found that government funding, existing relationships with others, 
and revenue tend to increase nonprofit contribution level to collaboration for climate change 
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adaptation. Interestingly, age of nonprofit organization has a nonlinear relationship with the 
nonprofit contribution to collaboration. The OLS regression for each component of the 
dependent variable (i.e., power, joint activities, human resource, funding, and information) 
provides some notable findings. It is found that nonprofit organizations with large board are 
less likely to contribute to collaboration in terms of power sharing and information sharing than 
nonprofits with medium board. Also, collaborative capacity, social learning, demographic 
diversity, and community support, in part, influence nonprofit contribution to collaboration. In 
the second section, nonprofit roles in climate change adaptation are identified. In general, the 
social capital creation role is most frequently played among the Korean nonprofit organizations, 
but the political advocacy role is least frequently played. The comparison of nonprofit roles by 
service areas reports that nonprofit organizations engaging in emergency management and 
natural resource conservation have the same pattern as above. However, as for the nonprofit 
organizations working for energy saving and development, innovation role occupies the most, 
and the rest three roles (i.e., social capital creation, service provision, and political advocacy) 
have almost same portions with each other. 
Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation with the summary of the findings. Theoretical and 
practical implications are also presented. This chapter also discusses the limitations of the study 




NONPROFIT CONTRIBUTION TO COLLABORATION FOR CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION  
2.1 Overview: Different Theoretical Frameworks Explaining Collaboration 
While much has been written about the importance of interorganizational collaboration, 
few have examined the roles of nonprofits in mitigating risks associated with climate change 
(e.g., sea level rise). Most of the theoretical development has been devoted to understanding 
regional governance and collaboration at the watershed level (Scholz & Stiftel, 2010), 
transportation (LeRoux & Carr, 2007), public safety (Andrew & Hawkins, 2012; Andrew, Short, 
et al., 2015), and economic development (Agranoff & McGuire, 1999; Lee et al., 2012). 
The decision for organizations to contribute to collaboration is not a straightforward 
process. For example, according to Feiock (2013), organizations often have to deal with 
coordination, division, and defection problems when deciding whether to participate in 
regional governance. The problems are particularly acute when an organization has to deal with 
coordination of tasks among its members, decide on the allocation of costs and benefits from 
the joint effort, and make a decision whether members of the joint effort have conflicting 
interests and defect from their commitment to contribute to the efforts of the collective action. 
Traditional argument of collective action problem is made by Olson (1965). He asserts 
that “unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or 
some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-
interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests” (p.2). That is, 
individuals with self-interests attempt to take a free ride to gain public goods which are non-
excludable. However, the argument has been contradicted by scholars (Elster, 1989; Hardin, 
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1982; Ostrom, 2000; Udéhn, 1993). Successful collective action can be taken through 
communication, reputation, and reciprocity rather than coercion.  
There are at least three theoretical frameworks explaining interorganizational 
collaboration: (1) institutional collective action framework, (2) resource dependence theory, 
and (3) transaction cost theory. To understand motivation and incentives for nonprofit 
organizations to collaborate with other organizations, an overview on each theoretical 
framework and discussion about their strengths and weaknesses are provided.  
2.1.1 Institutional Collective Action Framework 
The institutional collective action (ICA) framework explains collaborative institutions in 
which various entities establish a partnership with one another to solve the shared problems 
that otherwise cannot be resolved individually. According to Feiock (2013), ICA dilemmas occur 
from “the division or partitioning of authority in which decisions by one government in one or 
more specific functional areas impact other governments and other governmental functions 
(p.397).”  
The ICA framework provides resolving mechanisms of collective action problems based 
following four elements: (1) types of collective action dilemmas, (2) the authorities in the policy 
arena, (3) the potential risks of collaborative activities, and (4) the incentives to motivate actors 
(Feiock, 2013). Application of the ICA framework initially requires that types of dilemmas the 
actors face be identified. Most common problems generated by fragmentation of political 
authority include negative externalities, diseconomies of scale of services, and common pool 
resource problems. Among these, negative externality dilemma is the most challenging case 
because application of incentive is not appropriate. More specifically, a jurisdiction which 
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imposes a negative effect on neighboring entities does not have incentive to internalize the 
externality but does gain benefits from distributing negative externality. In this case, centralized 
regional authorities covering functional and geographic scope can internalize the problem of 
externality (Feiock, 2013).  
2.1.1.1 Collaboration Risks  
The ICA framework manifests potential risks of collaborative works: coordination 
problems, division problems, and defection problems (Feiock, 2013). Coordination issues arise 
when the tasks are complex and associated across multiple jurisdictions. For example, if local 
governments initiate a project associated with multi-jurisdictions, coordination of tasks among 
actors are necessary for successful collaboration. Risk of incoordination can be mitigated 
through authoritative mechanisms (Andrew & Kendra, 2012).  
Distribution problems refer to unequal or disproportionate allocation of costs and 
benefits from the joint work among participants. Despite better-off for all actors, if parties 
disagree with distribution of joint gains or perceive unfairness in bearing expenses, 
collaboration cannot be effective. Thus, division problems can be alleviated through bargaining 
and negotiation over the allocation of costs and benefits (Feiock, 2013).  
Defection risks emerge when a choice of one party generates worse-off to the other 
party. While coordination and division problems occur under the shared goals, defection 
problems are based on conflicting interests among parties. For example, if an actor in 
collaboration seeks for its own short-term interests, it will generate inefficiency collectively 
without mechanisms that integrate individual decisions. When there is uncertainty due to lack 
of information, actors are, in particular, at risk of counterparties’ opportunistic behavior (Brown 
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& Potoski, 2005). Thus, ensuring the credible commitment to the collaboration through 
authoritative mechanisms is necessary to mitigate the risks (Feiock, 2013). Building trust and 
reciprocity through communication among parties is also required to overcome defection risks 
(Ostrom, 1998).  
2.1.1.2 Mechanisms for Resolving ICA Dilemmas 
With the premise of the institutional collective action dilemmas, the ICA framework 
provides mechanisms through which participants mitigate collaborative risks of coordination, 
distribution, and defection. Feiock (2013) provides two different mechanisms to overcome 
collaboration risks based on transaction costs and expected gains. One is formal mechanisms 
which primarily rely on authoritative enforcement and contractual agreements. The other is 
informal mechanisms based on norms and other socially embedded factors. Determination of 
effective mechanisms depends on nature of dilemma. The stronger enforcement, the higher 
transaction costs. Collaborations engaging more actors require higher transaction costs.  
First, formal mechanism such as multilateral interlocal agreement requires higher 
transaction costs for monitoring than informal mechanism. However, it is more effective for 
collaboration with high risks than informal one since the costs increases slowly as risks increase 
(Feiock, 2013). In contrast, informal mechanism like self-organizing network expects low costs 
when it has low level of risks. However, transaction costs increase abruptly as risks increase 
(Feiock, 2013). It reveals that informal collaboration (i.e., informal network) is more effective 
when risks are low, highlighting significance of credible commitment in self-organizing 
collaboration.  
In practical understanding of interlocal cooperation based on ICA framework, how local 
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governments’ perception of the costs is differentiated is imperative. First, asset specificity and 
measurement difficulties increase costs because asset specificity makes it difficult to be 
redeployed to other uses, and measurement problems rarely generate divisible outcome 
(Brown & Potoski, 2003; Feiock, 2007). Second, demographic heterogeneity among and within 
local governments and the geographic distance between local governments increase costs due 
to the difficulty of negotiation for fair distribution of benefits. Third, council-manager form of 
government and longer tenure of elected officials decrease costs based on professional norm 
(Feiock, 2007; Hefetz et al., 2014). Fourth, policy networks among the local governments also 
decrease costs with mutual friendships (Feiock, 2007; Thurmaier & Wood, 2002).  
2.1.1.3 Strengths and Weaknesses 
The ICA framework has several strengths. First, the ICA framework provides 
comprehensive explanation on interorganizational collaboration by considering a sociological 
approach and an economic approach at the same time. A concept of collective action is 
combined with the transaction cost and the social exchange theories within the framework to 
elucidate how multiple entities co-work for mutual benefits such as resolution of multi-
jurisdictional problems (Feiock, 2014). More specifically, transaction costs of negotiating, 
monitoring, and enforcement can be reduced by social embeddedness. Theories of social 
embeddedness inform that network relationships embedded in social, political, and economic 
structures reduce shirking and consolidate credible commitment (Uzzi, 1997). 
Another strength of the ICA framework is its emphasis on the dynamics of decentralized 
governance systems. The framework reflects forces to cause the evolution of institutional 
arrangements, allowing possible multiple equilibria (Feiock, 2014). Based on the ICA 
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framework, trust among parties promotes establishment of collaborative relations by 
decreasing transaction costs induced in the process of collaboration. For example, at the 
implementation stage of the cooperation, local governments consider whether the distributions 
of mutual gains are fair (Kwon & Feiock, 2010), which requires trust among the contracting 
parties (Feiock, 2007). Mutual trust among counterparties expedites negotiation by solidifying 
the belief of fair distribution of mutual gains. It is also believed that collaborations among 
organizations in a trust relationship are less costly in terms of monitoring (LeRoux et al., 2010). 
It is also strength of the ICA framework that it offers appropriate collaborative 
mechanisms for resolving the problems according to the type of collective action dilemmas 
(Feiock, 2013). Matching between collaborative mechanisms and ICA dilemmas has a 
theoretical implication since it facilitates empirical tests of hypotheses developed based on the 
ICA framework. It has a practical implication as well in terms of guiding organizations to 
establish proper types of collaborative structures.  
However, ICA framework has limitations as well. One limitation of the ICA framework is 
a risk of consistency lack originated from its conceptual foundation. As aforementioned, the 
framework combines sociological and economic perspectives in explaining collaboration 
(Feiock, 2014). Despite the comprehensiveness incurred from considering two different 
approaches at the same time, there is a risk of losing consistency as well. More specifically, 
from the sociological perspective, interdependency among actors is positively associated with 
collaboration (Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Based on transaction cost theory, 
increasing mutual dependence incurs endogenous uncertainty associated with opportunism in 
transaction, increasing transaction costs (Williamson, 1975). Thus, interdependency between 
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parties has a negative effect on collaboration.  
The ICA framework has another limitation that the application of the framework is 
biased toward providing a local government perspective. As an alternative to Tiebout model, 
which explains how the level of local expenditure of public goods is determined (Tiebout, 1956), 
the ICA framework has been used to understand local government collaboration. Most 
empirical studies on the framework deal with collaboration at the local level (Andrew, Jung, et 
al., 2015; Feiock, 2009; Hawkins & Andrew, 2010; Kwon & Feiock, 2010; Tavares & Feiock, 
2014). Only a few studies apply the ICA framework to other entities than local government such 
as nonprofits (Jang et al., 2016). 
2.1.2 Resource Dependence Theory 
Resource dependence theory suggests that interdependence promotes collaboration. 
Lack of resources leads to voluntary exchange of resources among individual organizations 
within the interorganizational network (Sullivan & Skelcher, 2017). Levine and White (1961) 
define organizational exchange as “any voluntary activity between two organizations which has 
consequences, actual or anticipated, for the realization of their respective goals or objectives 
(p.588).” Public managers have faced a demand for more resources necessary for better public 
services and have met the demand by the simple way of trading or sharing the resources which 
their organizations possess.  
The concept of interdependence comes from the premise that no organizations are self-
sufficient. Organizations inevitably interact with encompassing environments in order to import 
resources necessary for their survival. (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). According to Emerson (1962), 
social relationships usually generate “ties of mutual dependence (p.32),” with one party relying 
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on the resources belonged to the other party in order to achieve its goals. In particular, smaller 
organizations might be more likely to be involved in formal types of collaboration for the 
purpose of getting better access to important resources due to greater resource shortage (Guo 
& Acar, 2005). That is, one party collaborates with the other party because activities of the 
other party affect its successful achievement of goals. However, interdependency implies that 
one party also influence the other party’s activities to some degree. Accordingly, once 
established, the partnership is maintained, making their interdependence on resources greater. 
2.1.2.1 Strengths and Weaknesses 
Resource dependence theory has some advantages. One advantage of the resource 
dependence theory is that it offers fundamental explanation of collaborative works. 
Collaboration is defined as “a concept that describes the process of facilitating and operating in 
multi-organizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be solved or easily solved by 
single organization (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003).” As known from the definition of collaboration, 
a main rationale of joint works is originated from reliance on other organizations.  
Another strength of resource dependence theory is that it expands organizational focus 
to external environments. Shift of organizational focus from the internal distinctions of 
organizations to encompassing environments is significant because it helps study of 
organizational collaboration from the macro perspectives. It is also critical in terms of allowing 
consideration of the external dynamics of interdependency, interaction, and competition 
among organizations (Shafritz et al., 2015).  
Resource dependence theory also has a strength of offering an insight into power 
relations inherent in the collaborative structure. Based on the resource dependence theory, 
22 
resources are a basis of power. Sullivan and Skelcher (2017) state that “power resides implicitly 
in the other’s dependency (p. 40).” Given that it is difficult, in reality, to keep balance of powers 
among actors, power imbalance exists in many cases. It implies that strategic management of 
power distribution among collaborative parties is essential for successful collaboration. 
Despite several advantages, the resource dependence theory reveals disadvantages. 
First, there are few empirical studies of collaboration based on the resource dependence 
theory. Even though the theory has long been a primary theoretical framework to understand 
relations between organization and surrounding environments, empirical analyses lack (Drees & 
Heugens, 2013). Empirical study is important because it is a process of verifying theory by 
testing hypotheses. In this sense, resource dependence theory fails to provide clear 
collaboration model. 
It is also weakness of resource dependence theory that expected problems in the 
process of collaboration are not identified. In other words, resource dependence theory does 
not look at pay-off in outcomes. Given that power resides in dependency (Sullivan & Skelcher, 
2017), one party is more likely to attempt to control over the other party as power imbalance 
generated by rise of dependency greatly increases. This implies increasing dependency hinders 
successful collaboration.    
2.1.3 Transaction Cost Theory 
Transaction cost theory originally has been used to explain collaboration as an activity of 
buying, selling, or exchanging goods and services among parties, which is determined based on 
benefits and costs of the transactional activity. Transactions occur to manage the imperfection 
of organizational structure (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975, 1985). More specifically, economic 
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agents make an investment in resources necessary to reduce the impacts of imperfection in 
transaction. Such investments are transaction costs (Cordella, 2009). If relevant information 
necessary to decision-making is perfectly and efficiently informed among the structures, 
transaction costs approach zero. In contrast, costs increase if the imperfection of decision-
making structures increases.  
In this sense, collaboration is generated to reduce costs necessary for production and 
provision of goods and services. If in-house production of goods and services costs greater than 
co-production of goods/services with others or contracting goods/services out, individuals 
prefer the latter to the former. It has been broadly applied to account for various phenomena 
from economic to political collaborative works. 
Costs are generated in each stage of transaction: search, negotiation, and enforcement 
stages. In the stage of search, costs are generated in finding information on exchange. For 
example, from the supplier side, costs are necessary for marketing; and from the user side, 
costs of search for items (i.e., goods and services) are involved. In the negotiation stage, both 
parties need costs in predicting risks of the transaction and preventing or minimizing such risks. 
In the stage of control, costs are involved in monitoring and enforcing the contract (Cordella, 
2009; Kwon & Feiock, 2010; Nooteboom, 1992). 
Most transaction costs are generated only when the transaction is associated with 
specificity of assets (Williamson, 1975). Investment for specific assets can be lost if the 
transaction is not continued. Whereas such a risk causes loss to one party because it results 
from unpredictable contingencies for the future (bounded rationality), unpredictable 
contingencies might be advantageous to the other party (opportunism). If there is no specificity 
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of assets in transaction, one can trade with another partner without loss even in case of 
opportunism. However, if opportunism happens with regards to specific assets, a loss related to 
the assets is inevitable. Opportunism occurs on the occasion of contingencies which cannot be 
foreseen at the time that a transaction agreement is made. Thus, such uncertainty about 
opportunism increases transaction costs (Nooteboom, 1992). 
Transaction cost theory offers a contradicting idea regarding interdependence and 
collaboration. Once transactions take place, information can be collected and managed with 
relatively low transaction costs under the price mechanism due to the reduced uncertainty. 
However, if resource dependency between trade parties increases, the transaction is associated 
with endogenous uncertainty related to opportunism over time, followed by increase of 
transaction costs. In such a situation, the hierarchy (in-house production) based on predefined 
norms and regulations, as an alternative mechanism, is more efficient to manage such 
uncertainty than market system (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975). Thus, there is a possibility 
that mutual dependence among parties might hinder collaboration due to growing transaction 
costs. 
2.1.3.1 Strengths and Weaknesses 
Transaction cost theory has its advantages. First, transaction cost theory as an economic 
approach provides a parsimonious mechanism of decision-making for collaborative works. It 
reflects costs incurred through each process of an exchange systematically (i.e., searching for 
counter parties, negotiating, and monitoring). In specific, if benefits of joint works are expected 
to be greater than costs, a decision of collaboration is made.  
TCT also provides a theoretical explanation of why institutional arrangements for 
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collaborative governance change continuously. According to the design school of 
institutionalism, rational actors create and change institutions to minimize transaction costs by 
reducing uncertainty and to maximize their interests (Williamson 1985). Institutions, which are 
governance structures, are evolved over time because individuals with bounded rationality 
cannot create perfect rules that specify all possible outcomes and costs of the social exchange 
relationships at a time. When the rational actors discover better governance structures for their 
self-interests than the existing institutions, the actors change the governance structure to the 
more favorable one. 
As another strength, the use of transaction cost theory in public sectors contributes to 
expansion of economic concept into political area, highlighting rationale of political 
collaboration between political principals (i.e., President and Congress) and agent (i.e., 
bureaucracy). For example, when considering legislation, Congress has two options. One is that 
Congress makes legislation directly, which requires costs for obtaining necessary information. 
The other is that Congress collaborates with the bureaucracy by delegating legislating power to 
the bureaucracy, which requires costs for monitoring. If the cost of internal legislation in the 
committee system is greater than the cost of external delegation to the bureaucracy, Congress 
delegates power to the bureaucracy (Epstein & O'halloran, 1999). 
Despite its broad application, transaction cost theory has limitations in explaining 
collaboration. One limitation of the transaction cost theory is that it does not consider 
contribution of social relationships in economic transaction. Even though Williamson (1973) 
denotes that economic actors sometimes forgo maximizing their benefits due to atmospheric 
reasons such as values, transaction cost theory fails to provide insightful thoughts beyond it. 
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According to Simpson and Willer (2015), collaboration is created and maintained by social 
mechanisms such as reputations, rules, and social relationships. For example, close friends 
make a transaction even with high asset-specificity because they trust mutually (Barney & 
Hesterly, 2002).  
The other limitation of the transaction cost theory is originated from the basic 
assumptions. Transaction cost theory assumes that production costs are constant across 
structures of governance or transaction modes. But production costs vary according to 
technologies, learning, and individual capacities (Foss & Klein, 2010; Hodgson, 2010). It has 
been argued that firms exist because the production of goods in hierarchy costs less than 
market transactions (Coase, 1937). However, the assertion overlooks an important possibility 
that the firm exists even when in-house production is costlier than exchange in market. The 
rationale of the firm can be found in providing an organizational environment enhancing the 
capabilities of members (Hodgson, 2010) rather than cost minimizing. 
Emphasis on economizing as an imperative of organizations (Barney & Hesterly, 2002) 
makes transaction cost theory have a limitation in explaining collaboration in public sector. 
While transactions in private sector are made based on economic calculation, transactions in 
public sector are conducted based on various values like publicness, democratic accountability, 
and social equity rather than economic values. For example, under the New Public 
Administration perspective, social equity is prioritized to economic efficiency. It implies that a 
governmental transaction cannot be solely accounted for by economizing. 
2.1.4 Summary of Three Theoretical Frameworks 
Three theoretical frameworks explaining collaboration are presented: institutional 
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collective action framework, resource dependence theory, and transaction cost theory. The 
institutional collective action (ICA) framework provides resolving mechanisms of collective 
action problems considering types of collective action dilemmas, political authorities, potential 
risks of collaboration and the incentives to motivate actors (Feiock, 2013). Risks of collaboration 
includes incoordination risks, distribution risks, and defection risks. According to the ICA 
framework, collaboration occurs when benefits induced by collaboration are greater than risks. 
Resource dependence theory suggests that actors collaborate because they do not have 
sufficient resources to solve the problems. Interdependence resulted from the lack of resources 
leads organizations to voluntarily engage in collaborative works. Organizations are not self-
sufficient. Thus, they inevitably collaborate with others to survive.  
Table 2.1: Strengths and Weaknesses of Theoretical Frameworks 
Strengths Weaknesses NPOs’ Motivation 
Institutional Collective Action Framework 
Providing a comprehensive 
explanation on interorganizational 
collaboration by combining 
sociological and economic 
approaches 
A risk of consistency lack 
originated from its conceptual 
foundation • Service improvement 
• Competitiveness 
• Legitimacy 
• Organizational capacity 
• Trustworthiness 
Emphasis on the dynamics of 
decentralized governance systems 
Application of the framework is 
biased toward explaining local 
government collaboration 
Matching collaborative 
mechanisms to the type of 
collective action dilemmas 
 
Resource Dependence Theory 
Offering fundamental explanation 
of collaboration 
Few empirical studies of 
collaboration  • Funding 
• Expertise 
• Technical assistance   Expanding organizational focus to 
external environment 
Veiled expected problems in the 
process of collaboration  
(table continues) 
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Strengths Weaknesses NPOs’ Motivation 
Providing an insight into power 
relations inherent in collaborative 
structure 
  
Transaction Cost Theory 
Providing a parsimonious 
mechanism of decision-making for 
collaboration  
Ignorance of power of social 
mechanisms such as reputation, 
rules, and social relationships 
• Service improvement 
• Cost savings 
Offering a theoretical explanation 
of institutional arrangement for 
collaborative governance 
Limitations of basic assumptions 
related to values of the firm 
Contribution to expansion of 
economic approach into political 
area 
Limited explanation of 
transactions in public sector  
 
Transaction cost theory explains collaboration as a transaction in market. Thus, if 
benefits of the exchange are greater than costs, the transaction occurs. In contrast, if costs of 
transaction are greater than benefits, in-house production occurs. Based on the transaction 
cost theory, collaboration is created to reduce costs due to uncertainty. However, this offers 
conflicting explanation with the resource dependence theory. While resource dependence 
theory suggests that uncertainty increases collaboration, transaction cost theory explains 
uncertainty impedes collaboration. Table 2.1 presents strengths and weaknesses of three 
theoretical frameworks. 
2.2 Why Nonprofits Contribute to Collaboration? Institutional Collective Action Framework 
2.2.1 Interorganizational Collaboration 
Interorganizational collaboration is defined as “a concept that describes the process of 
facilitating and operating in multi-organizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot 
be solved or easily solved by single organization. Collaborative means to co-labor, to achieve 
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common goals, often working across boundaries and in multi-sector and multi-actor 
relationships. Collaboration is based on the value of reciprocity and can include the public 
(Agranoff & McGuire, 2003).” Likewise, Sink (1998) provides the definition of 
interorganizational collaboration as “process by which organizations with a stake in a problem 
seek a mutually determined solution [by pursuing] objectives they could not achieve working 
alone (p.1188).” Other scholars (Bryson et al., 2006) similarly but differently provide concept of 
cross-sector collaboration, i.e., “the linking or sharing of information, resources, activities, and 
capabilities by organizations in two or more sectors to achieve jointly an outcome that could 
not be achieved by organizations in one sector separately (p.44).” Despite the various 
conceptual definitions of collaboration, they have a common reference to why organizations 
work together. Two or more organizations, whether they are within the same sector or 
different sectors, work together to achieve the mutual goal of solving problems that one 
organization cannot solve alone.  
Why an organization collaborates with others has long been a concern of scholars. 
However, in a majority of empirical studies, collaboration has been considered as a 
dichotomous concept (i.e., being in collaborative relationship with other parties or not being) 
(Jang et al., 2016; Kwon & Feiock, 2010; LeRoux et al., 2010; LeRoux & Carr, 2007). Little 
attention has been paid to how much contribute to the collaboration. Implications of those 
studies might be limited given that entering into collaboration does not necessarily mean 
actually doing things necessary to achieve shared goals successfully. To fill the gap, this study 
considers organizations’ contribution in collaboration.  
To consider contribution to collaboration, I adopt the definition made by Bryson et al. 
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(2006). This definition effectively captures the concept of collaboration with consideration of 
multiple dimensions of collaboration. Collaboration occurs as an intermediate step in a 
continuum of organizational sharing. At one extreme organizations share nothing each other, 
but at the other extreme organizations are integrated into a new entity (Crosby & Bryson, 2005) 
(Figure 2.1). 
Figure 2.1: Continuum of Organizational Sharing 
 
Source: Crosby and Bryson (2005, p.19) 
 
With a notable exception (Jang et al., 2016), the Institutional Collective Action (ICA) 
framework has been primarily applied to explanation of mechanism through which local 
governments overcome collective action problems (Andrew, Jung, et al., 2015; Feiock, 2009; 
Hawkins & Andrew, 2010; Kwon & Feiock, 2010; Tavares & Feiock, 2014). In understanding why 
nonprofit organizations contribute to collaboration, it is important to identify their benefits and 
risks through joint works with other organizations. This research will fill the lacuna by 
employing the ICA framework to understand contribution of nonprofits to collaboration for 
climate change adaptation. 
It has been argued that, based on the ICA framework, a participation to 
interorganizational collaboration generates not only benefits but also costs (Andrew, Jung, et 
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al., 2015; Feiock, 2009, 2013; Jang et al., 2016; Kwon & Feiock, 2010). According to Jang et al. 
(2016), nonprofits gain benefits such as service improvement, higher efficiency, strengthened 
capacity, and legitimacy from the participation to collaboration. In contrast, nonprofits face 
risks like autonomy loss, mission drift, and legitimacy damage. Given that nonprofits gain both 
benefits and risks through participation to climate change adaptation, the ICA framework is 
contributable to explaining nonprofits’ contribution to collaboration for climate change 
adaptation. 
2.2.2 Institutional Collective Action Dilemmas 
The costs of collaboration are borne by individual parties while the benefits of 
collaboration can be gained collectively. First, nonprofits in partnership with other parties may 
experience autonomy loss. Loss of autonomy is risky in terms of generating mission drift of 
organizations. Moreover, it could create “a cultural conflict--a more subtle internal resistance 
between seemingly similar organizations (Jang et al., 2016, p.171).” Nonprofits often engage in 
joint works to improve autonomy in fostering service innovation. However, nonprofit 
organizations’ attempts to achieve greater autonomy are prevented since the pursuits can be at 
odds with governmental demands for accountability (Feiock & Andrew, 2006; Gazley & 
Brudney, 2007). 
Collaboration can be understood as forming connections among collaborators, that is, a 
part of a shared decision-making process (Acosta et al., 2011). However, governments tend not 
to involve nonprofits in decision-making process. In the study of government-nonprofit 
partnership in local service delivery, Gazley (2008) identifies that decision-making authority in 
the partnership of local government with nonprofits is mainly reserved by government sector 
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across various service areas, arguing that exclusion of one party in decision-making is not 
authentic collaboration. In particular, imbalanced power to decide has a manifestation in the 
area of public safety and emergency response. 
Discrepancy in power among stakeholders often prevents nonprofits from influencing 
policies. While collaborative governance seeks for horizontal collaboration, pre-existing power 
relations tend to persist in participatory collaboration (Few et al., 2007). Nonprofits serving 
privileged population are more likely to impact on policy decision-making with sufficient 
resources provided by target customers. However, nonprofit organizations that serve low 
socioeconomic class are not expected to gain resources from the target population. Given that 
most affected groups by climate change are marginalized people, low-powered nonprofits have 
difficulties influencing policymaking without government supports. 
A recent observation of volunteerism types that have been paid attention by scholars in 
the emergency management field (Strandh & Eklund, 2018) poses another element impeding 
nonprofits’ participation in collaboration. Emergent volunteer groups, which have increased 
since the 1990s, can be operated shortly after disaster/emergency occurrence. They are less 
likely to be constrained by pre-existing rules and strategies than formally organized volunteer 
groups due to their improvisation (Whittaker et al., 2015). Despite unaffiliated volunteers’ 
advantages in emergency management, lack of training and limited experiences of co-works 
with emergency management agencies pose potential risks of disrupting organized responding 
and jeopardizing others and their own lives (Whittaker et al., 2015). 
2.3 Determinants of Nonprofit Contribution to Collaboration 
Organizational collaboration is influenced by both internal conditions of the 
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organization and external environments. Factors connecting the organization and the outside 
world also influence the collaboration. To explain nonprofit contribution to collaboration, I 
employ eight predictors under four categories: (1) organizational factors (board size and 
collaborative capacity), (2) government factors (government funding and red tape), (3) 
interorganizational factors (social relationships and social learning), and (4) community factors 
(demographic diversity and community support). Figure 2.2 presents a theoretical framework to 
examine what motivates nonprofit organizations to contribute to collaboration. Then, the 
effects of the eight factors are predicted and hypothesized as follows.  
Figure 2.2: Theoretical Framework 
 
 
2.3.1 Organizational Factors 
2.3.1.1 Board Size 
As a key governing body of nonprofit organizations, board of directors/trustees (or its 
equivalents) makes a wide range of decisions including organizational mission and goals, 
resource mobilization, programs and services, and other day-to-day activities. For nonprofit 
organizations, among the various roles of the board, obtaining resources through interactions 
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with other organizations is critical to the survival of the organization (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
For the nonprofit that performs a wide range of tasks, a large size of board allows members to 
engage in specialized tasks (O'Regan & Oster, 2005), and thus increasing possibility of 
association with diverse entities with specific knowledge and information. More importantly, 
individual board members create opportunities for organizational collaboration through 
individual ties with other organizations (Ihm & Shumate, 2019).  
According to Guo and Acar (2005), nonprofits are more likely to establish formal 
collaboration when their board members have more linkages with other nonprofits. Board 
members play a significant role in determining collaboration by providing information about 
potential partners based on their social relationships. That is, they develop personal affiliations 
into organizational collaboration (Ihm & Shumate, 2019). The board size of an organization 
does not necessarily have a direct linkage with the total number of social connections individual 
members have. However, it is possible that an organization with larger number of board 
members has more social connections with external entities, based on personal affiliations of 
members, than an organization with the smaller board.   
However, relationship between board size and collaboration is complex. It is also argued 
that board size is negatively associated with nonprofit collaboration. Board should ensure 
organization’s responsiveness to service demands with provision of services consistent with the 
organization’s mission. Nonprofits with large number of board members potentially have higher 
possibility of conflict interest than nonprofits with small number of board members, and thus 
making collaboration decisions difficult. Because decisions in nonprofit organizations are made 
based on value preferences, personal or professional interests of board members might conflict 
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with each other whenever an individual nonprofit organization represents multiple 
constituencies (i.e., clients, donors, governments, paid and unpaid staffs, etc.) (Anheier, 2014). 
Supporting this perspective, Aggarwal et al. (2012) point out that nonprofits with large board 
are likely to bear managerial costs due to disagreement among board members.  
As a comprehensive perspective of previous two conflicting arguments, it is expected 
that the medium-sized board is ideal for internal consensus among members in decision-
making and for the connection with external resources. Thus, I hypothesize that nonprofits with 
medium-sized board are more contributable to collaboration than nonprofits with small or 
large board. 
2.3.1.2 Collaborative Capacity 
Conventional wisdom suggests that nonprofit organizations seek for working together 
other organizations when they experience resource insufficiency (Guo & Acar, 2005; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Sullivan & Skelcher, 2017). Nonprofit organizations enter into partnership to 
gain resources which they need to achieve missions but do not possess sufficiently. Simply, a 
majority of organizations expect financial improvement through collaboration. However, a 
study on purpose of government-nonprofit partnership (Gazley & Brudney, 2007) suggests that 
it is not always the case (especially, in terms of human resources). For the survey question 
about what hinders nonprofits from collaborating, nonprofits present more agreement than 
disagreement about shortage of the staffs or time to manage the collaborative relationship. It is 
because nonprofit organizations with low collaborative capacity bear higher potential costs for 
collaboration such as mission drift and autonomy loss (Guo & Acar, 2005). Thus, I expect that 
when nonprofit organizations are not confident with their collaborative capacity, they are 
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reluctant to contribute to collaboration.  
HYPOTHESIS 1a: Nonprofits with small size of board (or its equivalent) are less likely to 
contribute to collaborative governance than nonprofits with medium size of board. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1b: Nonprofits with large size of board (or its equivalent) are less likely to 
contribute to collaborative governance than nonprofits with medium size of board. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Collaborative capacity is positively associated with the nonprofit 
contribution to collaborative governance. 
 
2.3.2 Government Factors 
2.3.2.1 Government Funding 
Funding from governments is one of the most effective motivations that drive 
nonprofits to collaborate with governments. Nonprofits are often involved in formal 
collaboration by hierarchical authority or requirement for granting of public agencies. When 
considering collaborative works between governments and nonprofit organizations, nonprofits 
desire funding from governments while governments expect expertise of nonprofits (Gazley & 
Brudney, 2007). According to Feiock and Andrew (2006), one type of collaborative relationships 
between nonprofits and governments in public service delivery can be defined as subsidiary 
beneficiary and provider. Governments provide nonprofits with grants, subsidies, resources as a 
trade for their contribution to public service delivery. 
Since the 1980s, nonprofit organizations have tried to diversify the sources of funding, 
especially with the growing reliance on commercial incomes. For example, service areas like 
health care, arts and culture, and childcare have successfully increased their revenues by 
charging fees for the services (De Vita, 1999). But this strategy is not viable for all service areas. 
In some areas of nonprofit services, governments are still a primary funding base of nonprofits. 
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In particular, the trend has a manifestation in the emergency services (i.e., disaster relief, 
response, and recovery). Also, given that a multitude of services provided by nonprofits are for 
the marginalized and disadvantaged groups, charging fees from the service customers is 
unrealistic (De Vita, 1999).  
However, there have been controversies on influence of nonprofit revenue on 
collaboration. In an empirical study of the relationship between nonprofit participation in 
collaboration and public funding (Jang & Feiock, 2007), the impact of government funding on 
interorganizational collaboration is not statistically significant. Nevertheless, authors argue that 
the possibility of the tested influence should not be dismissed without further separate 
examinations of relationships between grant versus contract revenues and collaboration. 
Nonprofits with declining revenue have more difficulties reducing collaboration costs than 
financially stable nonprofits, given that financial stability can increase the possible payoffs of 
collaboration, diminishing partner’s benefits of the collaboration (Jang et al., 2016). 
Funding from governments has more importance for some nonprofit service areas than 
for others. Jenkins et al. (2015), for example, emphasizes the importance of governmental 
grants to nonprofits by presenting “policy makers need to factor in funding for nonprofits to 
provide critical emergency response and recovery services (p.1272).” Nonprofit organizations 
point out the lack of federal financial supports is one of the major impediments to their 
engagement in disaster response and recovery (Acosta et al., 2011). Relevant problems include 
that nonprofits’ difficulties in operating large amounts of liquid assets and complicated 
reimbursement procedures between states and federal governments. A case study of disaster 
recovery in Alaska (Eller et al., 2017) demonstrates that governmental supports for general 
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expenses is critical to a successful government-nonprofit collaboration. 
2.3.2.2 Red Tape 
Red tape, which is commonly defined as constraint resulted from regulations, rules, and 
procedures (Baldwin, 1990; Rainey et al., 1995; Scott & Pandey, 2000), is considered as a barrier 
to nonprofit collaboration with government (Gazley & Brudney, 2007). Understanding of red 
tape can be through examining administrative delay (Kaufmann et al., 2019). Administrative 
delay captures time required to perform key tasks of organizations such as hiring/dismissing 
personnel, buying office supplies, and contracting services (Bozeman et al., 1992; 
Bretschneider, 1990). One critical motivation of collaborative relationship is to increase 
organizational efficiency by reducing time and energy necessary to organizational negotiation 
(Williamson, 1985).  
However, delays in completing tasks due to excessive emphasis on rules and other 
administrative procedures increase transaction costs (i.e., demanding time and energy) and 
thus offset or even exceed the potential benefits of collaboration (i.e., efficiency). Along with 
efficiency, nonprofit collaboration is motivated by competitive advantage (Gazley & Brudney, 
2007; Sowa, 2009). However, red tape is noted to influence negatively on organizational 
performance (Pandey & Moynihan, 2006; Walker & Brewer, 2009). It is contradicting to the 
effect that nonprofits expect from the collaborative relationship with other organizations. Thus, 
it is expected that nonprofits’ perception of red tape hinders nonprofit collaboration. 
HYPOTHESIS 3: Government funding is positively associated with the nonprofit 
contribution to collaborative governance.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 4: The perception of bureaucratic regulations and procedures is negatively 
associated with the nonprofit contribution to collaborative governance. 
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2.3.3 Interorganizational Factors 
2.3.3.1 Social Relationships 
Existing social relations promote nonprofits to collaborate with others by decreasing 
transaction costs induced in the process of collaboration. More specifically, pre-existing social 
relationships facilitate coordination among parties, lowering coordination costs. At the 
implementation stage of the cooperation, participants consider whether the distributions of 
mutual gains are fair (Kwon & Feiock, 2010), which requires trust among the contracting parties 
(Feiock, 2007). Mutual trust built based on routine interaction expedites negotiation by 
solidifying the belief of fair distribution of mutual gains. It is also believed that collaborations 
among organizations in a trust relationship are less costly in terms of monitoring (LeRoux et al., 
2010).  
It has been argued that mutual trust among actors based on social embeddedness 
promotes collaborative governance. Interorganizational relationships are embedded on existing 
structures. Networks formulated within the structures contribute to reduce shirking, and thus 
promoting credible commitment (Feiock, 2013; Uzzi, 1997). Ostrom (2010) is also aligned with 
this by arguing that trust building through interaction and communication among parties has 
more influence on resolving collective action dilemmas than external forces.  
In particular, from the nonprofit perspective, social relationships have a great 
significance in collaboration. According to Gazley (2008), trusting relationships should 
substitute for formal contractual arrangements since most public-nonprofit partnerships are 
informally established. Especially, in the emergency context, antecedent conditions such as pre-
disaster relationships encourage nonprofits’ contribution to collaboration by providing initial 
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trust (Nolte & Boenigk, 2011). A study of tornadoes in Oklahoma in 2013 (Murphy & Pudlo, 
2017) suggests that nonprofits with disaster response-related missions can bridge nonprofits 
whose missions are not disaster responses and emergency management agencies. It implies 
that existing networks promote nonprofits’ participation in collaborative governance. 
2.3.3.2 Social Learning 
Social learning through connectedness among various organizations is another factor 
explaining interorganizational collaboration in the context of climate change adaptation. 
Despite global consensus on global warming, uncertainty of climate change impact on the world 
such as sea level rise and necessity of responding are still on debate (Malone, 2009). Sharing of 
knowledge and experiences helps individual organizations understand complexities of climate 
change. For example, organizations can learn from other entities’ decisions associated with 
climate change. Peer support and peer pressure function in an affirmative way of encouraging 
mutual commitment to the collaboration (Vella et al., 2016). 
Nonprofit organizations are motivated to collaborate with other parties by desire for 
organizational legitimacy. Social learning opportunities offered by collaborative governance 
contribute to legitimacy of nonprofits through mitigating environmental uncertainty around 
them. Local nonprofits are expected to contribute to strengthening community resiliency. 
Inexperienced organizations under the social and cultural pressure tend to imitate leading 
organizations’ practices in the same field to overcome lack of professionalism (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1991). Nonprofits may legitimize themselves to external stakeholders (i.e., donors, 
customers, etc.) by following practices implemented by the leading organizations within 
collaborative governance. Furthermore, mutual understanding fostered through the process of 
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social learning contributes to internal legitimacy among parties of collaboration (Bryson et al., 
2015). 
In context of emergency management for adapting to the climate change, social 
learning of nonprofits has a particular significance in entering into collaboration. Many 
nonprofits perform routine tasks in non-emergency situations and shift their works from pre-
disaster to post-disaster mode to meet emergent needs in crisis when a disaster occurs. For 
example, disaster relief such as shelter and food are primarily provided by nonprofits under the 
service areas of human services or philanthropy. Simo and Bies (2007) argue that, in disaster 
response and recovery, sharing of information, resource, and expertise is critical for 
collaboration, and it is particularly evident in nonprofit sector.  
HYPOTHESIS 5: Nonprofit organizations’ pre-existing relationships with other 
organizations are positively associated with the contribution to collaborative 
governance. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 6: Nonprofit organizations’ experiences of social learning are positively 
associated with the contribution to collaborative governance. 
 
2.3.4 Community Factors 
2.3.4.1 Demographic Diversity   
Characteristics of community form preferences for public services (Feiock, 2007). 
Demographic diversity within a community suggests divergence of preferences among 
residents. Homogeneous composition of citizens within a locality has a significance in making 
collaboration decisions because it influences the aggregation of preferences within the 
community (Feiock, 2007, 2013). In contrast, demographic heterogeneity within local areas 
increase negotiation costs due to the difficulty of fair representation of diffused community 
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preferences (LeRoux & Carr, 2007). The logic has an identical implication for nonprofits given 
that residents are potential clients of nonprofits. Diverse interests of community members 
make nonprofits as agents difficult to hold accountability in communities (Feiock, 2007). 
Nonprofit organizations encounter more challenges when they consider collaboration on behalf 
of clients since it is costlier to aggregate preferences of heterogeneous clients than 
homogeneous clients. 
2.3.4.2 Community Support    
Despite general consensus on importance of climate change adaptation, all programs 
for adaptation are not necessarily advocated by community. Discrepancy exists between 
objectives prioritized within community and actual activities required to achieve the objectives 
(Feiock et al., 2017). It can be exemplified by land use policy for climate change. One group may 
prefer high-density land use to reduce greenhouse gas emission caused by long-distance 
travels. The other group may prefer open space policy, i.e., low-density land use, for natural 
function (e.g., natural infiltration of water) instead of artificial management (e.g., piping) 
(Hamin & Gurran, 2009). It is expected that the level of community support influences 
nonprofits’ contribution to collaboration given that when nonprofits work together with other 
organizations to take activities highly supported in community, they achieve legitimacy and 
accountability easily. 
HYPOTHESIS 7: Demographic diversity within community is negatively associated with 
the nonprofit contribution to collaborative governance. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 8: Community support is positively associated with the nonprofit 
contribution to collaborative governance. 
 
43 
Table 2.2 summarizes the hypotheses developed in this chapter. I hypothesize that 
nonprofit organizations with medium-sized board are more likely to contribute to collaboration 
than nonprofits with small or large board. It is predicted that red tape and demographic 
diversity negatively influence nonprofit contribution to collaboration. Rest of the factors (i.e., 
collaborative capacity, social relationships, social learning, government funding, and community 
support) are hypothesized to be positively associated with contribution to collaboration.  
Table 2.2: Predictors of Nonprofit Contribution to Collaboration and Hypotheses 
Predictors (Influences) Hypotheses 
Organizational 
factors 
Board size  
Nonprofits with small size of board (or its equivalent) are 
less likely to contribute to collaborative governance than 
nonprofits with medium size of board. 
Nonprofits with large size of board (or its equivalent) are 
less likely to contribute to collaborative governance than 
nonprofits with medium size of board. 
Collaborative 
capacity (+) 
Collaborative capacity is positively associated with the 





Government funding is positively associated with the 
nonprofit contribution to collaborative governance. 
Red tape (−) 
The perception of bureaucratic regulations and 
procedures is negatively associated with the nonprofit 





Nonprofit organizations’ pre-existing relationships with 
other organizations are positively associated with the 
contribution to collaborative governance. 
Social learning (+) 
Nonprofit organizations’ experiences of social learning are 






Demographic diversity within community is negatively 




Community support is positively associated with the 





NONPROFIT ROLES IN CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 
3.1 Why the Nonprofit Roles Are Important in Collaborative Governance for Climate Change 
Adaptation? 
 
To address nonprofit roles in climate change adaptation collaboration, it is essential to 
ponder why nonprofit activities are important to climate change adaptation based on 
understanding of the fundamental characteristics of climate change. Values of nonprofit roles 
in collaborative governance for climate change adaptation can be placed in terms of awareness, 
advocacy, and charity.  
First, nonprofit organizations are important actors in collaborative governance for 
climate change adaptation as it is essential to raise awareness of the problem and disseminate 
relevant information for the success of climate change adaptation (Bies et al., 2013). Climate 
change is a long-term alteration of temperature and weather patterns. For example, disaster 
hazards caused by climate change, i.e., representatively sea level rise, are barely recognized by 
individuals within short period. Thus, the delivery of knowledge about climate change in an 
easy-to-understand language based on scientific data contributes to the individual perception 
of climate change as a social problem. For example, the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) 
publishes regional reports on the impacts of climate change to help citizens and politicians 
understand the expected impacts of climate change and be aware of the risks (Hall & Taplin, 
2010). Nonprofit organizations influence attitudes and behavior of the group members by 
delivering a variety of messages to them through a variety of communication channels. 
Furthermore, nonprofit organizations, based on public trust and credibility, can have a great 
influence on the climate change behavior of not only their members but also non-members 
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(Bies et al., 2013). The nonprofit sector has the ability to induce the public to make their 
lifestyle changes in the direction of reducing greenhouse gas emissions through events such as 
campaigns and education. 
Second, nonprofits involvement in climate change adaptation is significant in terms of 
advocacy given that the climate change issue is a collective action problem. Insofar as climate 
change adaptation cannot be achieved by relying on individual voluntary behavior changes, 
institutional arrangements (e.g., norm, policy, legislation, etc.) are needed to coordinate 
individual behavior. Community-based nonprofit organizations are vital in terms of inducing 
whole community to work together, and thus developing community resiliency. For example, 
grass-root organizations help the whole community be aware of local vulnerability to climate 
change through training of the community members for recovery from disasters. The public 
awareness of risks contributes to citizen engagement and, in turn, leads to political decision to 
collaborate with other jurisdictions (Andrew, Jung, et al., 2015).  
Nonprofit organizations have actively and effectively put pressure on the development 
of climate change adaptation policies in a variety of ways such as lobbying and campaigning. 
Representatively, environmental nonprofits in California had great influence on climate policies 
in the state during the terms of Schwarzenegger as Governor. As an example, Bluewater 
Networks initially drafted AB 1493, the first regulatory legislation for greenhouse gas emission 
of passenger vehicles, and finally made the bill passed through the coalition with other 
environmental groups. Similarly, Vote Solar worked with governments and utilities to make 
legislation that innovates solar energy policy in California. The policy aims to reduce reliance on 
fossil fuel and nuclear power by incentivizing the installation of solar energy production 
46 
facilities on the roofs of newly built homes (Hall & Taplin, 2010).  
Furthermore, nonprofit advocacy is effective even when the government is lukewarm in 
climate change adaptation policy. Climate policies of local governments are greatly influenced 
by elected officials’ willingness. Without political benefits such as credit claiming through 
anticipatory outcomes (Yi et al., 2017) or branding benefits (Prakash & Potoski, 2007), political 
leaders are not expected to call for participation in collective action for climate change 
adaptation. Because climate change adaptation generates long-term outcomes rather than 
immediate outcomes (Few et al., 2007), local actors is less likely to engage in collective action 
for climate change adaptation. However, mission-focused nonprofit attributes, not their own 
interests, combat political apathy and contribute to the development of climate change 
policies.  
Third, nonprofit role in climate change adaptation has another importance in terms of 
charity when considering that the impacts of climate change are unevenly distributed by 
groups, communities, or countries. In specific, negative impacts of climate change on people 
are more pronounced and influential to the disadvantaged than the advantaged. It is because 
advantaged people are capable of mobilizing resources necessary for minimizing the impacts, 
but disadvantaged people are not. With an emphasis on demand-side orientation of nonprofits’ 
action, it is argued that support for vulnerable populations to climate change (i.e., marginalized 
groups, low-income class, minorities, etc.) is one of the most fundamental responsibilities 
assigned to nonprofit organizations (Frumkin, 2002). A majority of nonprofits (67.9% as of 2012) 
in the United States are classified as charitable organization, i.e., 501(c)(3)s, based on the 
Internal Revenue Code. Despite their provision of services which do not specifically target the 
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needy, nonprofits are primarily identified as organizations that help underprivileged people 
(Collins, 2011).  
From the supply-side perspective, too, nonprofit sector is effective in helping those who 
have been negatively affected by or at risk from climate change. Nonprofit organizations are 
the channel through which actors voluntarily provide human and financial resources necessary 
to help vulnerable groups (Frumkin, 2002). In conjunction with advocacy events like campaigns, 
nonprofit organizations can attract advocates’ attention to the social cause of climate change 
adaptation, which can lead to successful fundraising and volunteer recruitment. Through the 
nonprofit mechanism, the raised funds are distributed efficiently to the neediest, and the 
workforce is systematically allocated to charitable activities. A case study on the 2009 flooding 
in Alaska (Eller et al., 2017) shows service delivery of nonprofits in disaster recovery process. 
Multiple nonprofits from 48 states (e.g., Mennonite Disaster Service, Christian Reformed World 
Relief Committee, Samaritan’s Purse, Salvation Army Disaster Service, etc.) voluntarily provide 
construction labor. Furthermore, voluntary participation of faith-based organizations generates 
effects beyond effective housing reconstruction. Interaction between affected individuals and 
volunteers through various community activities (e.g., meal sharing and campfire gatherings) 
plays a critical role as a successful disaster coping mechanism, highlighting values of nonprofit 
role in collaborative governance.  
3.2 Theoretical Frameworks Explaining Nonprofit Roles 
Despite importance of nonprofit roles in collaboration for climate change adaptation, 
few empirical studies have conducted. Empirical observation of nonprofit roles in collaboration 
provides an evidence of what nonprofit organizations do to achieve goals within their 
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relationships with other organizations and the public. For the empirical study on nonprofit 
roles, it is important to understand the theoretical frameworks that explain the nonprofit roles. 
Representatively, following three studies provide different perspectives on the nonprofit roles: 
(1) nonprofits as supplements, complements, and adversaries, (2) nonprofits as the intersection 
of demand vs. supply and instrument vs. expression, and (3) nonprofits as multiplayers. To 
answer the second research question that what the roles of nonprofits are in collaborative 
governance, each of the three approaches to the nonprofit roles is reviewed. Then strengths 
and weakness of the classification are discussed. 
3.2.1 Nonprofits as Supplements, Complements, and Adversaries 
Young (1999) suggests three types of nonprofit roles, i.e., supplementary, 
complementary, and adversarial roles, based on the relationship of nonprofits with 
government. Theoretical backgrounds explaining each role are presented in the following.   
Table 3.1: Nonprofit Role Typology (Young, 1999) 
Types Descriptions Diagrams 
Supplements 
• Compensating for a lack of 
services by governments 
• Meet the heterogeneous service 
demands which cannot met by 
governments  
Complements 
• Partner or contractual 
relationship 
• Provide services when 
contracting out is more cost-
effective  
Adversaries Press governments to provide new services for minorities 
 
 Source: Young (1999) Source: Derrick-Mills (2015, p.245) 
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3.2.1.1 Nonprofits as Supplements 
Nonprofits as supplements provide services, which are not provided by governments, on 
a voluntary basis. According to Weisbrod (1975), a government provides public goods (i.e., non-
rivalrous and non-excludable) to the constituents with diverse preferences within a political 
jurisdiction. Because government’s decision on the level of public goods to provide is made 
based on voting mechanism, the preferences of median voters are primarily considered. Service 
provisions of the government are also constrained since the government provides services in a 
uniform and universal way and levies same level of taxes (Douglas, 1987). As a result, 
government fails to provide citizens with public goods efficiently. This means that some citizens 
are oversupplied, and others are under-supplied than they prefer. As a solution of the problem, 
nonprofit organizations supplement public goods to fill the unmet needs when governments 
cannot meet heterogeneous service demands.  
Typically, rapid reliefs after a disaster are usually performed by local nonprofit 
organizations. Because local nonprofits are proximate to the affected people, they provide 
basic goods like food, clothes, and shelters timely and effectively. For example, when a series of 
tornadoes touches down Oklahoma on May 2013, local nonprofits such as Feed the Children 
and the Regional Food Bank of Oklahoma provided foods and shelters to the displaced people 
(Murphy & Pudlo, 2017). So, nonprofits supplement the roles that are played by local agencies 
during emergency relief.   
3.2.1.2 Nonprofits as Complements 
Nonprofits as complements have contracts or partnerships with government that 
government funds and nonprofits deliver services. Young (1999) provides rationales of the 
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complementary perspective on the nonprofit-government relationship based on economic 
theories. First, a complementary role of nonprofits is understood based on collective action 
theory (Olson, 1965). If the service to be served is non-rivalous and non-excludable (i.e., public 
goods), no one is likely to contribute to provide the service on a voluntary basis. Instead, once 
the service is provided by a party of the group, “free riding” of the rest in the group is 
manifested, and eventually the service will not be provided properly. Hence, as a solution of the 
collective action problem, government finances the service and nonprofits undertake service 
delivery.  
Transaction cost theory helps clear understanding of the nonprofit role as complements 
as well. When government attempts to provide diverse public services directly, more costs can 
be required to administer and manage those services. Depending on the type of service, 
different sectors (i.e., nonprofits or for-profits) have more capacity to achieve economies of 
scale, so at some point, it is less expensive for government to contract services out to other 
sectors than producing them internally (Coase, 1937).  
However, the cost effectiveness cannot explain fully why government works with 
nonprofit organizations rather than the business sector. Another aspect of transaction cost 
theory is the primary characteristics of nonprofits. That is, the nonprofit sector has a variety of 
bottom lines rather than making profits. Government contracts out not only to reduce service 
delivery costs but also to better respond to differentiated demands of citizens. Responding to 
the heterogeneous demands often requires much information. As a solution, government can 
contract out services to the private sectors with sufficient information about consumers. 
However, without own information, government cannot guarantee whether the services are 
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differentiated enough to satisfy various preferences. Contracts with nonprofits are more 
advantageous to the government in terms of reducing negotiating, monitoring and enforcing 
costs than ones with for-profits. It is because nonprofit organizations rarely shirk the 
responsibilities for making more profits (Steinberg, 1997). 
3.2.1.3 Nonprofits as Adversaries 
Nonprofits as adversaries stimulate the government to make legislation or to change 
policies. An adversarial relationship between nonprofits and governments is substantial in 
understanding how new policies that reflect minorities’ voice are made. Nonprofit advocacy 
can be illuminated with the government failure theory (Weisbrod, 1975). When service 
preferences are heterogeneous within a community, demands of minor groups are not 
reflected well. Then minorities develop self-organizations to deliver services that reflect their 
preferences, and even give pressure on governments to defend their interests. New policy 
proposals in favor of minority groups are initially poorly adopted by the government, but they 
eventually receive more support as efficacy of voluntary contributions proves (Young, 1999).  
Reciprocally, government attempts to influence nonprofit behavior. Economy theory 
also helps better understanding of why government oversees nonprofit organizations on 
occasion. Based on the contract failure theory (Hansmann, 1980), nonprofits play an effective 
role in the provision of services in case of information asymmetry between producers and 
consumers of the services where consumers can be deceived by producers. More specifically, 
non-distribution constraint of nonprofits significantly lowers the possibility of cheating 
consumers when comparing to for-profit firms.  
Another governing structure of nonprofits that donors and consumers play an efficient 
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role of monitoring service provision makes nonprofit organizations more trustworthy (Ben-Ner 
& Gui, 2003). Despite their trustworthiness, nonprofits need to be monitored and regulated 
because the trustworthiness can be ensured on the premise of nonprofit governing structures 
(Young, 1999). To summarize, nonprofit organizations contribute to advocacy of minorities, 
especially where the information asymmetry is severe. Efficacy of nonprofit role as adversaries 
is ensured by government’s oversight mechanism.    
Three roles of nonprofits are not mutually exclusive and are present all together at any 
time. But one role of them has been historically more dominant than others during a certain 
period. The historical review of the government-nonprofit relationships in the United States is 
helpful for understanding. In the 17th century, new forms of charitable activities such as 
orphanage and relief were conducted by minorities. The services that were outside the interest 
of the government were provided by ethnic and religious organizations without government 
support. Beginning as one of the colonial welfare systems, nonprofit activities have expanded 
into various programs with the emergence of large foundations based on private wealth such as 
Carnegie and Rockefeller in the early 20th century (Young, 1999).  
However, the supplementary perspective cannot account for entire history of nonprofit 
activities since the role is not dominant in the relationship between nonprofits and government 
(Hall, 2002; Nielsen, 1979). The gap can be partly filled with the complementary perspective. In 
the late 19th and the early 20th centuries, nonprofit provision in the health, social service, and 
art areas with government funding were commonly observed. Contractual arrangements 
between government and nonprofit organizations were dramatically expanded during the 
1960s and 1970s and peaked in the early 1980s. Although the partnership was challenged with 
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the cutback of federal funding in the Reagan administration, the interaction between 
nonprofits and government has commonly observed (Young, 1999).  
One side of whole nonprofit history remains unrevealed without looking through the 
adversarial lens. As the nonprofit sector became more dependent on government funding in 
the 1960s and 1970s, the government tended to more control and regulate nonprofit activities. 
Through the mid- and the end of the 20th century, the government continued to restrict 
advocacy activities of tax-exempt organizations through various ways like tax reform and the 
Istook amendment. Meanwhile, the nonprofit sector engagement in public affairs became more 
apparent. The nonprofit sector, especially aforementioned large foundations (e.g., Carnegie and 
Rockefeller), intended to change society in social, economic, and political terms by mobilizing 
the influential citizens and forming public opinion. The history of the government-nonprofit 
relationship in the United States demonstrates overlapping existence of three nonprofit roles 
(i.e., supplements, complements, and adversaries),so we need to take a look through those 
three lens at the same time, to understand the relationship. 
3.2.1.4 Strengths and Weaknesses 
Nonprofit roles based on the flow of resources, suggested by Young (1999), clearly 
contrast the characteristics of independence and interdependence between nonprofit sector 
and the government. The supplements category suggests that nonprofit organizations are 
autonomous and independent from the government. These nonprofits decide autonomously 
what kind of services to offer to fill the government shortage and then mobilize resources they 
need on their own. That is, the relationship between government and nonprofit sector is 
characterized by “operational independence and zero-sum thinking” (Anheier, 2014, p. 432).  
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In contrast, nonprofits as complements mainly provide services contracted out from the 
government. In the complementary relationship between nonprofits and government, “the 
simultaneous two-way flow of resources” (Saidel, 1991, p. 550) is observed. Resources include 
not only funds but also non-monetary elements like information, expertise, and political 
support (Saidel, 1991). In the complementary relation, two sectors achieve mutual gains. That 
is, the government achieves efficiency through contracting out, and the nonprofit easily secures 
fund. 
Despite solid theoretical foundation, the emphasis on what position the nonprofit takes 
in the relationships with government makes it difficult to reflect some important roles of the 
nonprofit sector such as social entrepreneurship and individual expression (see Figure 3.3). For 
example, many nonprofit organizations adopt innovative ways to broaden their financial 
sources (Zimmermann, 1999) and to achieve social values (Weerawardena & Mort, 2012). For 
many of nonprofit organizations, voluntary actions are considered as investments to create 
social wealth, not simply charity for the needy (Anheier, 2014).     
3.2.2 Nonprofits as the Intersection of Demand vs. Supply and Instrument vs. Expression 
Frumkin (2002) provides four critical functions of nonprofit sector based on two 
different dimensions. One consideration is whether the nonprofit actions are driven by 
demand-side or supply-side. The other consideration is whether the nonprofit actions are 
rationalized as instruments or expression. As a result of constructing a matrix with two 
dimensions as each axis, the following four roles are generated: providing services, mobilizing 
civic and political engagement, supporting social entrepreneurship, and actualizing personal 
values. 
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3.2.2.1 What Drives Activities of the Nonprofit Sector: Demand vs. Supply 
From the demand-side perspective, nonprofit activities are explained as responses to 
the demands of customers. The nonprofit sector has grown with the function of providing social 
needs unmet by other sectors. Especially, it has been argued that nonprofits are responsible for 
serving underprivileged groups in society. As aforementioned, government typically focuses on 
preferences of median voters, and thus remaining minority demands unmet (Douglas, 1987). 
Advantaged class is affordable to purchase high cost of goods or services. Accordingly, demands 
of the needy people like food, a medical service, and housing are remained unmet. The 
unsatisfied demands of the minorities can be met through nonprofit activities. Nonprofit 
organizations not only provide services directly to disadvantaged people but also advocate their 
participation in political areas (Frumkin, 2002). 
As an alternative, a supply-side approach posits that nonprofit activities are driven by 
resources from, and commitment of, donors, volunteers, social entrepreneurs, and staffs. 
Descriptively, the theory underlines how the entrepreneurial nonprofit model challenges typical 
models based on government failure and market failure theories. The role of supply groups 
such as donors, volunteers, and social enterprises is emphasized as a real force driving the 
nonprofit sector. That is, the nonprofit sector is maintained by supply groups’ intention to help 
needy people rather than demands of marginalized people. Thus, the supply-side perspective 
prioritizes protection of interests and values of voluntary actors while the demand-side 
approach advocates interests of the marginalized in society. The theory argues that the 
interests and values of voluntary actors should be protected first in order to ensure a 
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continuous flow of philanthropic resources and ideas from donors and volunteers (Frumkin, 
2002).  
3.2.2.2 What Justifies Nonprofit Sector: Instrument vs. Expression 
The commitment of nonprofit organizations to the wide range of activities in society 
leads to two different ideas about the justification of nonprofit activities (Frumkin, 2002). One 
perspective is that nonprofit activities are justified as a useful instrument to deliver important 
public services in communities. The role as a service delivery tool has been increasingly 
emphasized with efforts to measure the performance of the nonprofit sector. More specifically, 
the sector has increased the efficiency of nonprofit organizations in providing public-purpose 
programs by evaluating the outcomes of their activities (Frumkin, 2002). 
Figure 3.1: Matrix of Nonprofit Roles 
 
Source: Frumkin (2002) 
 
The other notion is that nonprofit organizations are meaningful since they help 
individuals express their personal values and faiths through the voluntary works and donations. 
In specific, donating to a certain nonprofit organization indicates that the donor expresses 
support for the specific values that the nonprofit organization pursues. Likewise, volunteers 
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give their voices to a specific cause through their dedication to nonprofit organizations that 
advocate the cause. Four nonprofit roles are presented in Figure 3.1. Each nonprofit 
organization can play more than one role simultaneously.  
3.2.2.3 Strengths and Weaknesses 
The intersectionality of nonprofit orientation and rationale provides systematic 
perspective on nonprofit roles as Frumkin argues (see Figure 3.1). Especially, supply-side 
approach to nonprofit orientation sheds light on nonprofit actors (i.e., staffs, volunteers, and 
donors) as important components of nonprofit management. The supply perspective is 
meaningful in that it, in part, offers the theoretical background for nonprofit management. 
More specifically, volunteers are vital human resources for nonprofit organizations given that 
the nonprofit sector tends to be more labor-intensive than capital-intensive (Anheier, 2014).  
Nonprofit organizations rely heavily on volunteer workforces. For example, 61.2 million 
volunteers worked about 5.7 billion hours in the United States in 2006 (Eisner et al., 2009). 
However, there has been significant turnover in volunteers. From 2005 to 2006, 20.9 million 
(Brudney & Meijs, 2009) and, between 2006 and 2007, 21.7 million (Eisner et al., 2009) quit the 
volunteering. Volunteers are primarily motivated by various non-monetary rewards. They 
expect to achieve a philanthropic desire, develop their talents, or improve their resume 
through volunteer experiences (Anheier, 2014). The loss of volunteers implies that protecting 
interests of volunteers is important to retaining the volunteers. Looking into the nonprofit roles 
through the supply-side lens contributes to development of nonprofit management strategies 
in terms of human resource and fundraising.  
Nevertheless, the supply-centered approach can undermine the mission of the 
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nonprofit organization. There is a controversy that a supply-centered approach overlooks the 
serious demand of the needy for charitable resources (Frumkin, 2002). A stronger focus should 
be placed on the demand side since the mission of a nonprofit organization is directly related to 
the demand rather than supply. Protecting the interests of suppliers should be a secondary goal 
necessary to achieve the fundamental goal of meeting the demands. 
3.2.3 Nonprofits as Multiplayers 
Despite outstanding contribution of Young’s (1999) and Frumkin’s (2002) works to the 
nonprofit role theory, few empirical studies have conducted based on them. Moulton and 
Eckerd (2012) further develop the work of Frumkin (2002) by offering subdivided nonprofit 
roles with measurement indicators. The typology of Moulton and Eckerd includes six roles of 
nonprofits: (1) service provision, (2) innovation, (3) individual expression, (4) political advocacy, 
(5) citizen engagement, and (6) social capital creation. With the expectation of the likelihood of 
empirically identifying a variety of distinctive nonprofit roles in climate change adaptation—i.e., 
answering the second research question, I review the concept of each role and discuss the 
distinctiveness and overlap of the six roles. 
3.2.3.1 Service Provision 
Delivery of public goods/services is the most fundamental function of nonprofit 
organizations when considering the growth of nonprofits. Based on government failure and 
market failure theories, the nonprofit sector arises to meet the demands for services that are 
neglected by the government or market. In the early stage of nonprofit sector development, 
the provision of services was made by independent financing of nonprofit organizations. Then, 
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partnerships with the government have further strengthened the nonprofit function to provide 
services. As measures to improve the efficiency of service delivery, nonprofits provide services, 
and the government funds the services. That is, this category includes the nonprofit roles as 
supplements and complements to the government suggested by Young (1999). The service 
delivery in nonprofit sector is advantageous over those in other sectors like government or 
market. It is because nonprofits are more flexible than governments in operation and policy 
changes.  
Furthermore, the non-distribution constraint in the nonprofit sector allows service 
delivery by nonprofit to be more trustworthy, especially when it is difficult to assess the service 
quality (Hansmann, 1980). According to Moulton and Eckerd (2012), service delivery role is 
performed most distinctively from other roles. More specifically, service delivery role is 
analyzed to have least correlation with other roles, and especially citizen engagement and 
individual expression roles are highly correlated with non-service provision roles such as 
political advocacy, innovation, and social capital creation (Moulton & Eckerd, 2012). As a 
representative example of nonprofit service delivery, when disasters occur, many nonprofits 
like Red Cross, Salvation Army, and Samaritan’s Purse serve affected people. Local nonprofit 
organizations often reach out to the people and figure out what the people need earlier than 
the government does.  
3.2.3.2 Innovation 
As the service delivery functions traditionally practiced in the nonprofit sector were 
increasingly eroded by the market sector, innovation from nonprofit organizations has been 
required (Weerawardena & Mort, 2012). More importantly, nonprofit organizations have been 
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called on to innovate as a way to secure the organization’s finances (Zimmermann, 1999). 
Based on theories of competition, it has been highlighted that innovation adopted by 
nonprofits, as in the case of businesses, makes them more competitive and, in turn, 
strengthens their financial position (McDonald, 2007). Weerawardena and Mort (2012) find 
that innovation throughout the work of nonprofit organizations is critical to increasing social 
impacts especially when the financial environment is highly uncertain. Social entrepreneurial 
nonprofits build the innovative competencies through active learning from markets, relations 
with other organizations, and internal experiments with new operation.  
Innovation brings about competitive advantage to both nonprofits and businesses. 
However, while the business sector seeks innovation for its own benefits, social entrepreneurial 
nonprofit organizations seek for operational innovations to create social values more effectively 
(Thompson, 2002). The nonprofit sector provides social entrepreneurs with opportunities to 
realize their visions of public values (Frumkin, 2002). In specific, nonprofit organizations 
compete to achieve their missions, namely to solve the societal problems that commonly faced 
by people in need, such as hunger, disease, and homelessness (McDonald, 2007). Thus, 
nonprofit organizations with a clear and motivating mission are likely to be more innovative 
than others because they focus more on the innovations that are most supportive of their 
mission achievement (McDonald, 2007).  
3.2.3.3 Individual Expression 
Frumkin (2002) suggests that nonprofit organizations function as channels for 
expressing personal values and beliefs to staffs, donors, and volunteers. Despite some 
discrepancies (Lee, 2012; Lee & Wilkins, 2011), nonprofit staffs are consistent with public 
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servants in that they have more prosocial motivations for their jobs than for-profit workers 
(Lee, 2012; Rotolo & Wilson, 2006). Given that, the commitment of employees and volunteers 
to nonprofit activities can be explained by public service motivation (PSM). Vandenabeele 
(2007) defines PSM as “the belief, values and attitudes that go beyond self-interest or 
organizational interest, that concern the interest of a larger political entity and that motivate 
individuals to act accordingly whenever appropriate (p.547).” With an application of public 
service motivation theories to nonprofit sector, voluntary engagement in nonprofit activities is 
based on a desire to pursue public values such as public interests and a sense of social 
responsibility (Kim & Vandenabeele, 2010), and it depends on intrinsic rewards rather than 
extrinsic rewards like monetary benefits (Perry & Wise, 1990).  
Donor motivation literature reveals that donation to privately provided public goods is 
motivated by a personal “warm glow” of helping needy people (Andreoni, 1989, 1990). 
Nonprofit organizations allow donors to feel a sense of satisfaction (i.e., warm glow) through 
charitable giving. More specifically, nonprofit actors express compassion for the people in need 
and the underprivileged through philanthropic works (Perry, 1996), and they express a desire to 
change society or a feeling of self-realization through policy advocacy (Kelman, 1987; Rawls, 
2009). Given that many nonprofits are reliant to volunteer labor (Hager & Brudney, 2004), 
nonprofit role of individual expression is critical for nonprofit sustainability. Garner and Garner 
(2011) empirically find that voice opportunities tend to increase volunteer retention. 
3.2.3.4 Political Advocacy 
Political advocacy, in a narrow sense, refers to activities that are directly involved in the 
policy making process such as lobbying or influencing legislation (Avner, 2010). In a broad 
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sense, however, it includes indirect efforts to affect political issues (Boris & Mosher-Williams, 
1998). Many nonprofit organizations voice on behalf of disempowered groups and advocate 
their interests, and thus helping democratic governments to be responsive to the needs of all 
the public (Kimberlin, 2010). As a result, advocacy function of nonprofits has a unique 
organizational competence (Salamon, 2002). Advocacy of municipal governments is highly 
dependent on elected officials. Political leaders tend to be less concerned with public affairs 
that do not bring political benefits to them. Given that advocacy activities by nonprofits are 
advantageous in overcoming political apathy of local governments, a political advocacy role of 
the nonprofit sector has another competence.  
The political advocacy role is, in part, linked to the social capital creation in that they 
emphasize mobilizing and empowering the underrepresented to give their voice (Frumkin, 
2002), which is also consistent with the works of Putnam (1993) and LeRoux (2007). However, 
Moulton and Eckerd (2012) demonstrate that political advocacy role is performed in opposite 
direction to social capital creation role in association with government funding. In specific, 
while political advocacy role is more likely to be performed by nonprofits with more 
government funding, social capital creation role is less likely, and, in turn, it implies the two 
roles are distinct. 
3.2.3.5 Citizen Engagement 
The concept of citizen engagement role is differentiated from political advocacy in that 
the former underlines the direct participation of citizens in the decision-making process 
whereas the latter focuses on nonprofit activities as representatives of customers (Moulton & 
Eckerd, 2012). Civic mindedness, which refers to the belief that individuals with moral and civic 
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responsibility perceive themselves as members of a larger social structure and, therefore, 
consider social issues at least partly theirs (Ehrlich, 2000), is learned through socialization 
throughout life. Thus, individuals with more experience or education related to civic 
engagement are more likely to engage in public issues (Anheier, 2014). Shiller (2013) also finds 
that civic engagement is promoted by the involvement in nonprofit programs that develop the 
capabilities to make changes. As a representative example, the American Association of State 
Colleges and Universities, the Carnegie Foundation, and The New York Times have worked to 
integrate civic engagement into higher education curricula through the American Democracy 
Project (Mehaffy, 2005).  
Along with building civic engagement capacity, nonprofit organizations also directly 
facilitate citizen engagement. A comparative study (Kasymova, 2014) reveals that citizen 
participation initiated by a grassroots community-based nonprofit is more effective than 
participation initiated by state or local governments. Citizen participation initiated by state and 
municipal governments is authoritarian (i.e., only informing citizen of programs) and 
bureaucratic (i.e., informing citizen and receiving feedback, but deciding unilaterally) rather 
than democratic (i.e., jointly deciding and implementing programs).  
3.2.3.6 Social Capital Creation 
From the social capital perspective, voluntary associations create opportunities where 
social networks, i.e., social capital, are developed among diverse individuals in a community. 
Through the networks, community members feel a sense of community, exercise leadership, 
exchange information, and take actions for community interests (Putnam, 2013). Nonprofits 
bring people in their communities together through community events or specific issues, which 
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in turn promotes civic engagement (Handy et al., 2014). Citizen engagement is influenced by 
organizational actions to aggregate individuals. Citizens in communities with many membership 
associations tend to organize horizontal relationships based on reciprocal trust, and, as a result, 
they are more likely to engage in public issues (Putnam, 1993).  
Since social capital is often associated with citizen engagement, citizen engagement 
literature, in general, considers social capital creation as one of patterns of citizen engagement 
or use them interchangeably (Anheier, 2014; Frumkin, 2002; Handy et al., 2014; Putnam, 1993, 
2013). However, Schneider (2007) identifies that social capital creation does not always 
engender civic engagement. Whereas civic engagement brings benefits to the entire 
community based on generalized trust, social capital allows only network members to benefit 
from mutual and enforceable trust among members. A comparison of Poverty Prevention in 
Washington D.C. and Ethnic Mission in Kenosha, Wisconsin shows the difference of the two 
concepts. Poverty Prevention serves the homeless throughout the community with the 
resources from various groups in the community. However, Ethnic Mission offers the services 
to the marginalized ethnic group in the Kenosha only through connections within the Latino 
community (Schneider, 2007).  
Moulton and Eckerd (2012) support that the concepts of social capital creation and 
citizen engagement are not always identical. Correlation analysis between nonprofit roles 
shows that citizen participation can be driven by social capital or political advocacy, but there is 
no significant relationship between social capital and political advocacy. The finding indicates 
that those three roles can be considered to be distinct from each other. Figure 3.2 presents 
description of nonprofit roles proposed by Moulton and Eckerd (2012).       
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Figure 3.2: Diagrams of Nonprofit Roles (Moulton & Eckerd, 2012) 
(a) Service provision (b) Innovation 
 
 
(c) Individual expression (d) Political advocacy 
 
 
(e) Citizen engagement (f) Social capital creation 
  
transferred impact;      expected impact;      network 
Source: revised from Levine Daniel & Fyall (2019)
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3.2.3.7 Strengths and Weaknesses 
The significance of the Moulton and Eckerd classification is placed on its usefulness for 
empirical study on nonprofit roles. It provides precise and clear descriptions of each role, and, 
in turn, it facilitates empirical testing (Levine Daniel & Fyall, 2019). The typology based on the 
relationship between nonprofits and government (Young, 1999) does not provide sufficient 
empirical evidence, while presenting solid theories on nonprofit functions as a service provider 
and a policy advocate. The classification suggested by Moulton and Eckerd complements the 
weakness of Young’s work. Although scholars have conducted empirical studies on a specific 
nonprofit role (Child & Grønbjerg, 2007; LeRoux, 2007, 2009; McDonald, 2007; Mosley, 2010), 
few studies have empirically analyzed multiple roles of nonprofit organizations simultaneously. 
Thus, creation of the nonprofit role index is meaningful in that it increases the possibility of 
future empirical study.  
This role classification also facilitates understanding of the power relationship among 
stakeholders. By looking at the nonprofit position in various relationships with multiple 
stakeholders, we can predict the outcome of each relationship (see Figure 3.2). For example, 
nonprofit organizations as policy advocates directly pressure governments to create or change 
policies that meet the public interests. In contrast, nonprofit organizations as democratic 
intermediaries encourage citizens to participate in the decision-making process, and as a result, 
the government creates the public interests. However, the detailed classification, paradoxically, 
poses a potential risk of being unable to identify some distinctive roles (i.e., political advocacy, 
citizen engagement, and social capital creation) due to partial overlap of them. 
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3.2.4 Summary of Three Perspectives on Nonprofit Roles 
To understand the theoretical frameworks explaining the nonprofit roles and the 
classification of them, three perspectives on nonprofit role were reviewed and discussed. Based 
on the relationship of nonprofit organizations with the government, the nonprofit sector 
supplements the roles that are not played sufficiently by governments and complements 
government roles under contract with the government. The nonprofit sector also influences 
government policies (i.e., adversaries) (Young, 1999). 
Table 3.2: Comparison of Nonprofit Role Typologies 
Young (1999) Frumkin (2002) Moulton & Eckerd (2012) 
Origin 
Based on the relationship of 
nonprofit with the government  
From the intersectionality of 
orientation dimension and 
rationale dimension  
Build on Frumkin’s work (2002) 
and adding particular roles 
emphasized in existing studies 
Strengths 
Contrasts the independence 
and interdependence between 
nonprofits and the government  
• Provides systematic 
perspective on nonprofit 
roles 
• Especially, supply-side 
approach sheds light on 
nonprofit actors as 
important components of 
nonprofit management 
• Nonprofit role index is 
useful for empirical analysis 
of multiple nonprofit roles 
• Facilitates understanding of 
power relationships among 
stakeholders 
Weaknesses 
Cannot account for some 
important roles like social 
entrepreneurship and individual 
expression 
Supply-centered approach can 
undermine the mission of the 
nonprofit organization  
Potential risk of being unable to 
identify some distinctive roles 
(i.e., political advocacy, citizen 
engagement, and social capital 
creation) due to partial overlap 
of them 
 
The intersection of two different dimensions, i.e., driving force of nonprofit actions and 
rationale of the nonprofit sector generates another classification of the nonprofit roles: service 
68 
delivery, social entrepreneurship, values and faith, and civic and political engagement. From one 
perspective, voluntary actions of the nonprofit organizations are motivated by demands of the 
needy people. The other viewpoint argues that nonprofit activities are led by the groups that 
provide resources. Concerning the rationales of nonprofit actions, one side argues that 
nonprofit activities are justified as an instrument to provide services, while the other 
emphasizes the nonprofit function that allows participants to express individual values and 
beliefs (Frumkin, 2002).  
Building on the Fumkin’s work (2002), Moulton and Eckerd (2012) propose six nonprofit 
roles. The roles of service delivery, innovation, and individual expression are consistent with the 
former typology (i.e., Frumkin’s). Despite the partial overlap, political advocacy, citizen 
engagement, and social capital creation fall into three separate roles based on literature review 
and empirical analysis of correlations.  
To facilitate understanding and comparison of the three typologies of nonprofit roles, I 
attempted to match the nonprofit role components. Figure 3.3 reports that the nonprofit 
functions proposed by Frumkin (2002) are in large consistent with the typology of Moulton and 
Eckerd (2012). However, Moulton and Eckerd propose more detailed categories than Frumkin. 
Young’s typology (1999) is in part consistent with the roles suggested by the other two studies, 
but does not account for some functions such as social entrepreneurship, individual expression, 
and social capital building.  
To answer the second research question, what are the roles of nonprofits in 
collaborative governance for climate change adaptation, the dissertation adopts the typology 
suggested by Moulton and Eckerd (2012). It is important to secure validity of the measurement 
69 
to clearly capture the various nonprofit roles. Despite the limitation, the typology of Moulton 
and Eckerd has a strong advantage for empirical studies of nonprofit roles in that it provides 
nonprofit role indexes.   






4.1 Site Selection: South Korea 
To answer the questions that why nonprofit organizations contribute to collaborative 
governance (i.e., motivations) and that what they do in the collaboration (i.e., roles), nonprofits 
in South Korea will be examined. The region is appropriate to test hypotheses regarding 
nonprofit contribution to collaboration for climate change adaptation for the following reasons: 
vulnerability to climate change, existence of central government-led collaborative governance 
for climate change adaptation, and the growth of nonprofit sector. Prior to explanation of data 
collection, vulnerability to climate change and the collaborative governance for climate change 
adaptation in South Korea will be provided along with an overview of nonprofit sector in South 
Korea.    
4.1.1 Vulnerability to Climate Change 
South Korea is important to the study of collaboration for climate change adaptation 
due to the climate change vulnerability. South Korea is threatened by various types of hazards 
such as typhoon, local heavy rain, sea level rise, and temperature rise. These hazards are 
expected to be more exacerbated due to the climate change. The average annual temperature 
in Korea has been steadily rising since 1980s. In particular, frequency, intensity, and duration of 
heat wave have clearly increased since the late 1990s (KMA, 2020).  
Especially, South Korea has a vulnerability to climate change originated from geographic 
factor. South Korea is a peninsula surrounded by the sea on three sides (i.e., east, south, and 
west) of the country. Thus, sea level rise and a coastline erosion due to climate change are 
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threatening coastal communities. Mean sea level has risen by 2.90mm per year between 1989 
and 2017, which is higher than global rate of sea level rise for the same period, i.e., 2.00mm/yr. 
Regionally, sea level rise around Jeju Island is the highest at 4.44mm per year, and the rate in 
the east coasts is 3.70mm per year. The estimated mean sea level rise is 1.30m by 2100, which 
is expected to submerge 1.2% of total area of South Korea (KMA, 2020).  
Table 4.1: Main Hazards and Disasters in South Korea 
Hazards Disasters 
Typhoon and local heavy rain Flooding 
Temperature rise Drought and heat wave 
Sea level rise Agricultural and human disease 
Source: Korea Meteorological Administration (2020) 
 
4.1.2 Collaborative Governance for Climate Change Adaptation 
South Korea has another significance to the study of collaboration for climate change 
adaptation in terms of providing a good practice of the nationwide collaborative governance. 
Hierarchical and horizontal governance have been in part established through the master plan 
and the action plans for climate change adaptation (Koh & Yi, 2015). More specifically, the 
central government-led measures for climate change adaptation have been created and 
operated nationwide for the past decade. In accordance with the Framework Act on Low 
Carbon, Green Growth, the Korean government creates a master plan through risk analysis 
based on the IPCC climate change scenario and updates every 5 years. At the central 
government level, a consultative body, which is composed of members of the Senior Executive 
Service from relevant central administrative agencies, is operated to discuss climate change 
adaptation issues. The central government distributes a guideline to establish regional action 
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plans for climate change adaptation at local level. Central administrative agencies and local 
governments (Si/Do and Si/Gun/Gu) establish action plans in accordance with the master plan 
and implement projects. When making action plans, governments should listen to opinions of 
stakeholders within the community such as residents, council, non-governmental entities, and 
experts. They conduct self-evaluation every year and the Ministry of Environment selects best 
practices and gives incentives through comprehensive evaluation. The result of the 
comprehensive evaluation and relevant information are opened to the public. Within the 
collaborative governance for climate change adaptation, the Korea Adaptation Center for 
Climate Change (KACCC), which was established by the Ministry of Environment, conducts 
climate change adaptation researches and distributes relevant knowledge and information to 
central and local governments. The KACCC also supports policy-making and implementation of 
action plans through the networks between governments, public agencies, and the private 
sector.  
4.1.3 Nonprofit Sector in South Korea 
The nonprofit sector in South Korea has been growing with a close association with the 
societal and political situations in Korea. Korean nonprofit sector has emerged as an 
independent institutional sector since the liberation from Japan in 1945. The Korean nonprofit 
organizations were primarily service-oriented for the needy people until the civil movement in 
1960. From 1960 to 1987, civil organization has dramatically grown as the resistance against the 
authoritarian regime. During the period, the representative activities of civic groups include 
democratization movements initiated by students and political opposition groups (e.g., 
Minchungryun and Minchuhyup) and mobilization of citizens for economic development of the 
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nation by pro-government organizations (e.g., Saemaul Undong). With the end of the 
authoritarian regime in 1987, new types of activities such as civic engagement in policymaking, 
advocacy of human rights, and protection of public resources like natural environment were led 
by new non-governmental organizations between 1987 and the early 1990s (Kim & Hwang, 
2002). Scholars argue that the period is the beginning of the civil society in South Korea (Choi & 
Yang, 2011; Kim & Hwang, 2002).     
Nonprofit organizations in South Korean account for various terms based on ownership, 
main actors, legal context, etc. Kim and Hwang (2002) provide major terms for nonprofit 
organizations such as NPOs, NGOs, civil society organizations, civil movement organizations, 
public interest corporations, and nonprofit civil organizations. NPOs (beyoungri danche) refer to 
all organizations that are neither government-owned nor for-profit. NGOs (mingan danche) 
describe civilian organizations (i.e., private organizations) except for educational institutions 
and medical institutions. Civil society organizations (simin danche) mean public interest-
oriented NGOs. They have played a role of monitoring and influencing government policies. 
Civil movement organizations (simin woondong danche) are civic groups that advocate 
democracy and pursue citizen right and social justice. Public interest corporations (gongik 
beopin) and nonprofit civil organizations (beyoungri mingan danche) are legal terms. They will 
be explained in the following sections.  
Despite various terms referring to nonprofit sector, I provide three legally defined terms 
of nonprofit organizations in South Korea to show their relations clearly. One legal term of the 
nonprofit organizations is nonprofit corporations (beyoungri beopin). Beyoungri and beopin 
mean not-for-profit and juristic person in Korean, respectively. In accordance with the Civil Act 
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of the Korea, nonprofit corporations (beyoungri beopin) refer to associations and foundations 
that are established for the purpose of academic, religious, charitable, artistic, social, or other 
nonprofit activities. This type of nonprofit organizations includes both associations seeking the 
interests of members and organizations for public interest. Nonprofit corporations are formed 
with a permission of the competent authority and must be registered to the seat of the 
principal office of the juristic person. Nonprofit corporations are exempt from income tax and 
other taxes, and they can receive tax-deductible contributions from not only individuals but 
also corporations. 
Another legal term of the nonprofit organizations is public interest corporations (gongik 
beopin). Public interest corporations, as defined by the Act on the Establishment and Operation 
of Public Interest Corporations, refer to juristic persons, either as incorporated foundations or 
incorporated associations, engaged in the support or payment of school expenses, scholarships 
or research funds, science and charitable organizations to contribute to the public interest of 
society. While nonprofit corporations emphasize not-for-profit organizations regardless of 
interests of members or public interests, public interest corporations only include nonprofit 
organizations seeking for public interests. Public interest corporations receive the largest tax 
benefits among nonprofit organizations such as exemption from income tax, inheritance tax, 
gift tax, and other taxes. They are eligible for tax deductibility for contributions from individuals 
and corporations, as the same to the nonprofit corporations. 
Nonprofit private organization (beyoungri mingan danche) is also a legal status of 
nonprofit organizations, which are defined under the Assistance for Non-Profit, Non-
Governmental Organizations Act. Mingan means non-governmental or private, and danche 
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means an organization or an association in Korean. (Kim and Hwang (2002) used ‘nonprofit civil 
organization,’ but ‘nonprofit private organization’ is appropriate when considering the legal 
purpose of the government to support voluntary public interest activities in the non-
government sector.) The Korean government created the legal status of nonprofit organizations 
in 2000 to promote public interest activities of nonprofit civil organizations and contribute to 
the development of a democratic society by providing financial and administrative supports. 
Not only nonprofit corporations (beyoungri beopin) but also nonprofit organizations that are 
not juristic persons are eligible for the nonprofit private organizations (beyoungri mingan 
danche). Nonprofit private organizations (beyoungri mingan danche) registered to a central 
administrative agency or a Metropolitan City/a Do (province level) in accordance with the law 
have the rights for government funding, tax reduction or exemption, reduction of postal 
charges, and other administrative assistance. They qualify for tax deductibility for individual 
donors, but not corporations. 
Nonprofit groups that are not subject to any of above categories are called as There are 
nonprofit voluntary associations (beyounri imui danche), i.e., nonprofit organizations that are 
not legally defined. The organizations are established by applying to the competent tax office 
and being assigned a unique identity number (equivalent to EIN of nonprofit organizations in 
the United States). Table 4.2 provides definitions and characteristics of the various types of 
nonprofit organizations in South Korea. Relations among the nonprofit organizations are 
presented in Figure 4.1. 
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Table 4.2: Classification of the Nonprofit Organizations in South Korea 
Type Definition and Characteristics 
Nonprofit corporations 
(beyoungri beopin) 
Civil Act  
• juristic persons established for not-for-nonprofit activities, either 
interest of members or public interest 
• require permission of competent authority and registration 
• exempt from income tax and others 





Act on the Establishment and Operation of Public Interest Corporations 
• juristic persons, either foundations or associations, engaged in 
activities to contribute to the public interest of society 
• require permission of competent authority 
• exempt from income tax, inheritance tax, gift tax, and others 






Assistance for Non-Profit, Non-Governmental Organizations Act 
• either juristic persons or non-juristic persons 
• registration 
• tax exemption or reduction 
• eligible for tax deductibility for individual donors 
Nonprofit voluntary 
associations 
(beyoungri imui danche) 
• Non-legal nonprofit organizations not subject to the above categories 
• Assigned a unique identity number from tax office 
 
Figure 4.1: Diagram of Nonprofit Sector in South Korea 
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Despite a rapid growth of the nonprofit sector, the study on nonprofit organizations in 
South Korea is limited. Many studies on Korean nonprofits have examined the growth and 
features of nonprofit sector in South Korea descriptively based on historical and political 
situations (Bidet & Eum, 2011; Choi & Yang, 2011; Kim & Hwang, 2002). Not much attention has 
been paid to nonprofit roles. Some quantitative studies on Korean nonprofits (Kim & Kim, 2013, 
2015) also focus on the general growth of the nonprofit sector rather than various roles of the 
nonprofit organizations. To fill the gap, this study investigates what roles are played by the 
Korean nonprofit organizations, especially in the context of climate change adaptation. 
4.2 Data Collection  
The subjects of my dissertation are nonprofit private organizations (beyoungri mingan 
danche) (i.e., shadowed in Figure 4.1) in South Korea. As aforementioned in the previous 
section, nonprofit private organizations are registered to a central administrative agency or a 
Metropolitan City/a Do (province level) and eligible for the government funding and other 
administrative supports under the Assistance for Nonprofit, Nongovernmental Organizations 
Act. For the empirical study on nonprofit collaboration in South Korea, I used a data set of the 
nonprofit private organizations opened to the public by the Ministry of the Interior and Safety 
(MOIS) of Korea through the NPO Public Activity Support System. The publicized information on 
the nonprofit private organizations includes organization name, registration number, 
registration year, chief executive officer, major activities, mailing address, phone number, etc.  
According to the MOIS, total 14,713 organizations are registered as nonprofit private 
organizations (beyoungri mingan danche), as of 2019. To test hypotheses in the context of 
climate change adaptation in South Korea, I consider, among 14,713 nonprofit private 
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organizations, 1,468 organizations that belong to the following three categories: (1) public 
safety and emergency management: disaster risk assessment, search and rescue, reliefs, 
rebuilding infrastructure, (2) energy-related: energy saving (recycling) and new/renewable 
energy development, and (3) natural resource conservation: conservation of species, nature 
conservation (river, ocean, and forest), etc. It is noted that, since the data set of Korean 
nonprofit organizations provided by the MOIS of Korea does not contain service codes such as 
the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) in the United States, I categorized the service 
areas based on descriptions of the main activities of each organization informed by the data 
set. Table 4.3 shows three subgroups of the survey population based on service areas.  
Nonprofit organizations engaging in public safety and emergency management 
(Category 1), which occupies least portion of the population (i.e., 15.3%), make efforts to 
reduce disaster risks due to climate change. Organizations like Korean Red Cross and Korea 
Disaster Relief Association provide disaster relief services such as sheltering and food 
immediately when disasters occur. In particular, Korea Disaster Relief Association has been 
delegated by the government to recruit, distribute, and manage donations for affected people. 
Many local organizations subject to this category are affiliated with the central headquarters, 
sometimes cooperating with the headquarters and other times acting independently within the 
community (e.g., Red Cross, Marine Corps Friendship Association, etc.). Category 2 (energy 
saving and new/renewable energy development) occupy 19.2 percent. Major activities of the 
group include provision of energy saving tips in daily life, various events for education on 
climate change and energy issues such as quiz contests, exhibitions, field trips, new and 
renewable energy experiences, etc. For example, Korea Climate and Environment Network 
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diagnoses energy consumption and provides consulting services to households, schools, and 
stores. Korea NGO’s Energy Network and Energy Justice Actions also engage in activities to 
develop policies of greenhouse gas emission reduction. Nonprofit organizations working for 
natural resource conservation (Category 3) are dominant (i.e., 65.5%). Nonprofit organizations 
in this category include Korea Federation for Environmental Movements, Green Korea, 
Environment Action Association and so on. They take various types of activities to protect 
natural resources from campaigns and educations for citizen awareness of environment 
problems resulted from climate change to clean-up of environment. The organizations also 
conduct research for the relevant policies. It should be noted that activities of the single 
nonprofit organization are not necessarily limited to a certain category. It has been observed 
that some organizations engage in activities of more than one category. However, the numbers 
of nonprofit organizations in Table 4.3 were counted only once based on the principal activity. 
Table 4.3 summarizes major activities of the three nonprofit categories observed in this study. 
Samples were randomly selected from a list of nonprofit organizations (i.e., 1,468 
Korean nonprofit organizations). Originally, about 300 nonprofit organizations were selected. 
Since the data set of the Korean nonprofit organizations that was used does not provide email 
addresses, I first tried to connect with the organizations via phone; I also collected personal 
email addresses of potential respondents. Because the unit of analysis is an individual nonprofit 
organization level, it was important to note that the survey questions were answered by 
individuals who were knowledgeable about the organizations’ activities such as chief executive 
officers, board members, or equivalent staffs. The phone numbers of organizations provided 
were often incorrect, and some organizations refused to participate in the survey.  
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Table 4.3: Population of the Survey (N = 1468) 
Service area Examples of NPOs Major activities No. of NPOs 
Category 1.  
Public safety and 
emergency 
management 
• Korean Red Cross  
• Korea Disaster Relief 
Association 
• Marine Corps 
Friendship 
Association 
• Disaster relief activities (e.g., sheltering, food, clothing) 
• Rescue and first aid 
• Reconstruction of damaged areas 
• Meal support for volunteers such as recovery workers 
• Recruitment, distribution, and management of donations 
• Education for disaster safety 
225 (15.3%) 
Category 2.  
Energy saving and 
new/renewable energy 
development 
• Korea NGO’s Energy 
Network 
• Korea Climate & 
Environment 
Network 
• Korea Resources 
Recycling 
Association 
• Energy Justice 
Actions 
• Provision of energy saving tips in daily life 
• Energy consumption diagnosis and consulting to households, 
schools, stores, etc. 
• Events for education on climate change and energy issues 
(e.g., quiz contests, exhibitions, field trips, new and 
renewable energy experiences, etc.) 
• Selection and promotion of best practices for low-carbon 
emission 
• Development of energy-related policies (i.e., new/renewable 
energy development and greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction) 
• Collection of recyclable waste and resources 
282 (19.2%) 
Category 3.  
Natural resource 
conservation 
• Korea Federation 
for Environmental 
Movements 
• Green Korea 
• Environment Action 
Association 
• Campaign for conservation of ecological environment such as 
wildlife habitat and river estuary wetland 
• River restoration movement 
• Clean-up of environment (e.g., garbage collection) 
• Research on climate change adaptation policy  
• Publication of environmental protection research reports and 
newsletters 
• Citizen education of climate change 
961 (65.5%) 
Note: Some organizations are engaged in activities of more than one category. Source: Ministry of the Interior and Safety of Korea and websites of the 
nonprofit organizations 
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Thus, the survey link was finally sent to 210 organizations via emails. The survey was conducted 
from January 7, 2021 to February 10, 2021. After two reminding calls, 106 organizations 
responded to the survey (50.5% response rate). I excluded five observations with missing values 
for the main questions such as collaboration level, nonprofit roles, annual revenue, etc. Finally, 
the responses from 101 organizations (48.1% response rate) were analyzed. 
Table 4.4 presents characteristics of survey participants in terms of organizations and 
personal respondents. Total 101 organizations responded to the survey. Based on their 
principal activity, more than half of organizations (54.4%) among 101 work for the natural 
resource conservation such as conservation of species and nature conservation (e.g., river, 
ocean, and forest). 32 nonprofit organizations (31.7%) engage in energy related affairs like 
energy saving (i.e., recycling) and new/renewable energy development for climate change 
adaptation. Participants working in the field of public safety and emergency management 
occupy only 13.9 percent (14 organizations). Nonprofit activities for climate change adaptation 
are not limited to single areas. Some organizations engage in multiple fields of activities. For 
example, 32 organizations among 101 respondents work for natural resource conservation as 
well as energy saving and development.   
A third of participating organizations has existed for more than 25 years. Slightly less 
than another a third of respondents are 15 to 24 years old. Only seven organizations are 
younger than five years. Regarding annual revenue, around 50 percent of respondents have 50 
to 500 million won of annual revenue, followed by 38.6 percent of respondents having less than 
50 million won of annal revenue. The number of full-time employees of respondent 
organizations is generally small. Over the 70 percent of participants have less than five full-time 
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employees (i.e., paid staffs and volunteers). Only six nonprofit organizations (5.9%) have 15 or 
more persons of full-time workers. 
Table 4.4: Profile of the Survey Sample 
Characteristics n % 
Organizational Characteristics 
Service area* 
a. Public safety & emergency management 14 13.9 
b. Energy saving & new/renewable energy development 32 31.7 
c. Natural resource conservation 55 54.4 
Organizational age 
(year) 
Younger than 5 years 7 6.9 
5-14 years old 28 27.7 
15-24 years old 32 31.7 
25 years or older 34 33.7 
Annual revenue 
Less than 50 million won 39 38.6 
50-500 million won 51 50.5 
500 million won or more 11 10.9 
Full-time employees 
Less than 5 persons 74 73.3 
5-14 persons 21 20.8 
15 persons or more 6 5.9 
Personal Characteristics of Respondents 
Job title 
President 28 27.7 
Board member/executive director 46 45.6 
Manager level 27 26.7 
Work experience in 
the nonprofit sector 
(year) 
Less than 5 years 22 21.8 
5-14 years 45 44.5 
15-24 years 20 19.8 
25 years or more 14 13.9 
* Multiple selection was allowed, and the number are marked based on the principal activity. Among 101 
organizations, 32 engage in b & c; 3 engage in a & c; 2 engage in all of three fields. 
 
On behalf of an individual nonprofit organization, individual personnel belonged to the 
organization responded to the survey. Almost half of individual respondents are board 
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members or executive directors. The presidents of organizations occupy 27.7 percent. The rest 
of the respondents are in manager level. Forty-four point five percent of individual respondents 
have 5 to 14 years of work experience of in the nonprofit sector. Around 20 percent and 14 
percent of individual participants have worked in the nonprofit organizations for 15 to 24 years 
and 25 years or more, respectively. The rest of respondents (21.8%) have less than 5 years of 
nonprofit working experience. 





• Fields of activities  
• Relevant administrative agency 
• Service region 
• No. of members in board of directors 
• No. of full-time employee 
• Annual revenue 




• Level of collaboration in the following terms: power, joint activities, human 
resource, funding, and information 
• Organizational perception of the followings: collaborative capacity, government 
funding, red tape, social relationship, social learning, and community support 
Part III. 
Nonprofit roles 
Level of the organizational performance in the following terms: service provision, 





• Job title 
• Working experience in nonprofit sector 
 
The survey questionnaire composes of four parts (see Appendix A). The first part is to 
obtain general information on organizations such as main activities. The second part is 
associated with the first research question (i.e., what factors explain nonprofit organizations’ 
contribution to collaborative governance for climate change adaptation?), and thus including a 
set of statements that address contribution to collaboration (i.e., dependent variable) and 
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factors expected to influence nonprofit contribution to interorganizational collaboration (i.e., 
independent variables). The next part of survey questionnaire is related to the second research 
question (i.e., what are the roles of nonprofits in collaborative governance for climate change 
adaptation?). The part includes statements about six types of nonprofit roles in collaboration 
(i.e., service provision, innovation, individual expression, political advocacy, citizen 
engagement, and social capital creation). The last part questions personal information on the 
respondents (e.g., job title and working experience). 
4.3 Measurements 
4.3.1 Contribution of Nonprofits Organizations to Collaboration 
4.3.1.1 Dependent Variable 
To answer the first research question, “what factors explain nonprofits organizations’ 
contribution to collaborative governance?”, Contribution to collaboration is employed as a 
dependent variable. The concept of contribution to collaboration is defined as actual sharing of 
information, resources, activities, and power to achieve mutual goals (see Chapter 2). To 
capture how much nonprofits actually work together with others to successfully achieve shared 
goals, a dependent variable is operationalized as a composite measure of five indicators: (a) 
power, (b) joint activities, (c) human resource/expertise, (d) funding, and (e) information. A 
majority of the indicators are created based on the definition of collaboration (Bryson et al., 
2006) to measure the concept directly. Power sharing requires common goals and jointly 
exercising capabilities to achieve the goals (Crosby & Bryson, 2005). Resources are measured in 
terms of human resource and financial resource separately. 
Each indicator is measured by a relevant statement presented in Table 4.6, respectively. 
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For example, to capture to what extent a nonprofit contributes to collaboration in terms of 
power sharing, a statement of “My organization works together with other organizations to set 
goals or make decisions.” is employed. Information sharing is measured by a statement, “My 
organization develops data and shares information for climate change adaptation with other 
organizations (e.g., sharing best practice, opening data to other organizations or the public, 
etc.).” Level of contribution to collaboration in terms of each indicator is measured based on 
Likert scale from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”), respectively. Then, a composite 
measure is calculated as a mean value of five indicators, ranging from 1 to 5. Cronbach’s alpha 
was checked to ensure reliability. There is a possibility that this operationalization cannot 
account for all components of collaboration. But narrowing survey statements to fit to the 
conceptual definition improves validity (Dixon et al., 2016) and facilitates respondents’ 
understanding and responding to the survey questions. Composite measure also contributes to 
validity since it reflects multi-dimensional concept of collaboration. 
4.3.1.2 Independent Variables 
The study examines the influence of four sets of factors on nonprofits’ contribution to 
collaborative governance: organizational factors (Board size and Collaborative capacity), 
government factors (Government funding and Red tape), interorganizational factors (Social 
relationship and Social learning), and community factors (Demographic diversity and 
Community support). Table 4.6 presents the measurements of independent variables. 
Board size, one of organizational factors, is measured as a categorical variable (i.e., small 
if board members are 6 or less; medium if board members are between 7 and 15; and large for 
16 or more). It has been employed to capture whether board size influence collaboration as 
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linkage with external organizations (Guo & Acar, 2005; Ihm & Shumate, 2019; MacIndoe & 
Sullivan, 2014). It is generally agreed that ideal number of board members is 7 to 15 (Montes, 
2019). As the other organizational factor, Collaborative capacity is utilized to reflect 
organization’s perception of ability to manage the collaborative relationship (Gazley & Brudney, 
2007). Collaborative capacity is measured based on Likert scale ranging from 1 (“strongly 
disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”) by a survey statement, “my organization has sufficient staffs 
and time to manage the collaborative relationship.” 
Government funding is employed as one of government factors. It is measured to 
capture influences of funding from governments on organizational collaboration (Andrew, Jung, 
et al., 2015; Gazley & Brudney, 2007; Jang & Feiock, 2007). It is measured with Likert scale of 1 
(“strongly disagree”) through 5 (“strongly agree”) using the statement, “major programs of my 
organization are funded by governments.” Another government factor, Red tape, is a proxy of 
the perception of administrative delay caused by regulations, rules, and procedures. It is 
measured based on organization’s perception of whether regulations, rules, and administrative 
procedures of the government constrain activities of the organization, with a five-point Likert 
scale (1 for “strongly disagree” and 5 for “strongly agree”).   
Interorganizational factors include Social relationship and Social learning. Social 
relationship is measured by a survey statement, “my organization has maintained 
formal/informal relationships with other organizations, i.e., government agencies, nonprofits, 
and private sector.” Response is scaled from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”). The 
variable captures whether pre-existing social relationship of an organization with other parties 
increases contribution to collaboration (Jang et al., 2016; Kapucu & Demiroz, 2015; Simo & Bies, 
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2007). Social learning is measured by a survey item, “my organization enhances understanding 
of climate change adaptation and acquires knowledge by participating in learning programs 
such as conferences and seminars.” Response is based on a Likert scale ranging from 1 
(“strongly disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”). The variable captures whether the experiences of 
social learning influence nonprofits’ contribution to collaborative governance.  
As community factors, Demographic diversity and Community support are employed. To 
capture demographic diversity (or homophily) within a group, scholars have been utilized 
various indices such as race (Kwon & Feiock, 2010; LeRoux et al., 2010; LeRoux & Carr, 2007), 
gender (Kagzi & Guha, 2018; Pelled, 1996; Sacco & Schmitt, 2005), and age (Kagzi & Guha, 2018; 
Kim et al., 2013; Sacco & Schmitt, 2005). This study considers age of community members to 
capture demographic diversity among community members served by the nonprofit 
organization. The perceptions related to climate change (i.e., causes, severity, and adaptation 
measures) differ by age group (ME, 2007). Thus, age is a proper index to capture demographic 
diversity concerning climate change adaptation. Demographic diversity is measured using Blau’s 
index (1 − ∑𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖2), where 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖  is a proportion of group members in i-th group. Blau’s index has 
been known as the optimal measure to capture the diversity of people within a group (Harrison 
& Klein, 2007; Miller & del Carmen Triana, 2009). The age group is categorized into under 15 
years old (i.e., young population), between 15 and 64 years old (i.e., working age population), 
and 65 years old or older (i.e., old population). Data of age is retrieved from 2010 Population 
and Housing Census of South Korea. Community support is used to reflect how much an 
organization perceives support for its activities within community. It is operationalized using a 
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5-point Likert scale (1 for “strongly disagree”; 5 for “strongly agree”) based on a survey 
statement, “Activities of my organization are supported by community.” 
4.3.1.3 Control Variables  
It has been argued that organizational characteristics as annual revenue (Bryson et al., 
2015; Jang & Feiock, 2007; Jang et al., 2016), and age (Bryson et al., 2015) influence nonprofit 
organizations’ contribution to collaboration. In this study, influences of those characteristics are 
controlled. Annual revenue is measured as the natural log of an organization’s annual revenue 
as of 2019 (Guo & Acar, 2005; Jang et al., 2016). Organizational age is measured as the 
difference between 2019 and the year when a nonprofit organization was established (Guo & 
Acar, 2005). 





a. Power. My organization works together with other 
organizations to set goals or make decisions. 





Mean value:  
1 to 5 
b. Joint activities. My organization engages in various joint 
activities for climate change adaption (e.g., conference, 
campaign, developing legislative policy statements, 
etc.). 
c. Human resource/expertise. My organization provides 
and receives staffs or experts to support activities for 
climate change adaptation (e.g., technical or 
administrative assistance). 
d. Funding. My organization makes investment, donation, 
or fundraising for climate change adaption. 
e. Information. My organization develops data and shares 
information for climate change adaptation with other 
organizations (e.g., sharing best practice, opening data 





Board size How many members does your organization have in board of directors (or its equivalents)? Logged value 
Collaborative 
capacity 

















My organization has maintained formal/informal 
relationships with other organizations, i.e., government 





My organization enhances understanding of climate change 
adaptation and acquires knowledge by participating in 






Blau’s diversity index based on age of community members 
(Source: 2010 Population and Housing Census of South 
Korea) 
1 − ∑ρi2,  
(ρi: proportion 
of group 
members in  
i-th group)  
Community 





Annual revenue Total revenue (2019) Logged value 
Organizational age Difference between 2019 and the year when a nonprofit organization was established   
 
4.3.2 Roles of Nonprofit Organizations in Collaborative Governance 
The roles of nonprofits, based on the typology of Moulton and Eckerd (2012) (i.e., 
service provision, innovation, individual expression, political advocacy, civic engagement, and 
social capital creation), are operationalized by a set of survey statements describing 
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performance of the nonprofit organizations. The dissertation uses survey items proposed by 
Moulton and Eckerd (2012). 
Respondents were asked by a statement, “To what extent does following statements 
appropriately describe the performance of your organization?” The items include three sub-
statements for each role. For example, a role as service provision is measured by followings: (a) 
My organization meets “an unmet need for a particular type of program/service in our 
community”; (b) My organization provides “high-quality programs/services”; and (c) My 
organization provides “cost-efficient programs/services.” The other role of nonprofits, 
innovation, is measured by statements: (a) My organization tries out “new ideas and 
approaches to programs/services”; (b) My organization provides “programs/services that have 
not been provided before in this community”; and (c) My organization serves “users/clients 
that have not targeted before for our types of services/programs (p.21).” Table 4.7 presents 
survey items for nonprofit roles. To prevent respondents from being aware of a set of roles and 
to improve validity, 18 sub-statements are presented in a mixed order instead of grouping by 
role. Response of each sub-statement is scaled by five-point Likert scale (1 for “not at all”; 2 for 
“a little”; 3 for “somewhat”; 4 for “quite a bit”; and 5 for “very much”).  
To ensure validity of measurement, I adopt survey items used in existing study (Moulton 
& Eckerd, 2012). However, there were the concerns about bias or errors due to cultural 
difference or language difference in measuring the roles of nonprofit organizations in South 
Korea with survey statements developed in the United States. Thus, factor analyses (i.e., 
principal component analyses) were conducted to check if the principal components were 
based on the measured responses (DeCoster, 1998).  
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Table 4.7: Survey Items for Measurements of the Nonprofit Roles 
To what extent does following statements appropriately describe the 
performance of your organization? 
1 (not at all);  
5 (very much) 
Mean value: 1 to 5 
Construct Measurements 
Service provision 
• Service1. My organization meets an unmet need for a particular type of 
program/service in our community. 
• Service2. My organization provides high-quality programs/services. 
• Service3. My organization provides cost-efficient programs/services. 
Innovation 
• Innovation1. My organization tries out new ideas and approaches to 
programs/services. 
• Innovation2. My organization provides programs/services that have not been 
provided before in this community. 
• Innovation3. My organization serves users/clients that have not targeted 
before for our types of programs/services. 
Individual 
expression 
• Expression1. My organization provides a vehicle for private donors to express 
their values through our programs/services. 
• Expression2. My organization supports for staffs to express their faith through 
work. 




• Political1. My organization participates in government committees or 
commissions. 
• Political2. My organization meets with public officials and staff and provides 
testimony on policy issues. 
• Political3. My organization participates in coalitions with other organizations 
for the purpose of influencing policy. 
Citizen 
engagement 
• Citizen1. My organization participates in or promotes voter education and 
participation. 
• Citizen2. My organization participates in/promotes public education 
campaigns. 
• Citizen3. My organization organizes community around social issues. 
Social capital 
creation 
• Social1. My organization promotes a sense of community among our 
users/clients. 
• Social2. My organization brings together people of different 
political/economic backgrounds through our programs/services. 
• Social3. My organization provides a place for people to socialize or feel a 
sense of belonging.  
Source: Moulton & Eckerd (2012). Note: Statement (b) for individual expression was revised from original 
statement proposed by Moulton & Eckerd. 
 
Based on eigenvalues greater than 1, factors were extracted. Three items with loadings less 
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than 0.5 (i.e., Expression2, Citizen2, and Social3) were eliminated through the first factor 
analysis for measured data for 18 survey items, and then factor analysis for the rest of 15 
survey items was reconducted. Table 4.8 reports a result of the final factor analysis. Survey 
items for service provision, innovation, and political advocacy load strongly on the relevant 
factor, respectively.  
Table 4.8: Factor Analysis of Nonprofit Roles Items 
Survey Items Service Provision & Innovation Political Advocacy 
Individual Expression 
& Social Capital 
Service1 0.525a 0.107 0.471 
Service2 0.832a 0.108 0.050 
Service3 0.691a - 0.076 0.314 
Innovation1 0.794a 0.021 0.076 
Innovation2 0.726a 0.012 0.273 
Innovation3 0.803a 0.229 0.058 
Expression1 0.312 0.347  0.458a 
Expression3 0.160 - 0.150  0.713a 
Political1 0.114  0.741a 0.004 
Political2 0.182  0.496a 0.390 
Political3 0.000  0.794a 0.010 
Citizen1 0.053  0.775a 0.015 
Citizen3 0.122 0.323  0.669a 
Social1 0.213 - 0.010  0.813a 
Social2 - 0.070 0.518  0.487a 
Note: Principal component analysis (orthogonal rotation, Varimax) was used to extract factors. Superscript a 
presents a loading greater than 0.4, which indicates a strong loading on the given factor.   
 
However, two exceptions were observed. Citizen1 and Citizen3 load strongly on political 
advocacy (0.775) and social capital creation roles (0.669), respectively. That is, it is identified 
that citizen engagement role of nonprofit was not separately measured. The result might be 
attributed to the partial linkages among political advocacy, citizen engagement, and social 
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capital creation roles as discussed in Chapter 3. Political advocacy, in a broad sense, refers to 
indirect efforts to influence political issues (Boris & Mosher-Williams, 1998). In this sense, voter 
education to encourage citizen participation to policy decision-making might be aligned with 
the efforts to influence policy making. Likewise, citizen engagement is often associated with 
social capital creation in that the community aggregation that promotes horizontal 
relationships based on mutual trust encourages citizen engagement in public issues (Putnam, 
1993). Eventually, five types of nonprofit role that are exclusive of citizen engagement were 
extracted through the factor analyses. 
Nonprofit roles were operationalized as composite measures of respective indicators 
that were extracted through the factor analysis presented in Table 4.8. Service provision role is 
calculated as a mean value of respective three indicators (Cronbach’s alpha=0.735). Innovation 
role is also computed as a mean of three indicators for innovation (Cronbach’s alpha=0.762). 
The nonprofit role of political advocacy is measured as a mean of three political advocacy role 
items and an item for citizen engagement (Citizen1) (Cronbach’s alpha=0.729). Social capital 
creation role is computed as a mean of two items for social capital creation and an item for 
citizen engagement (Social1, Social2, and Citizen3) (Cronbach’s alpha=0.622). Individual 
expression role was finally excluded from the analysis because the two survey items for the role 
(Expression1 and Expression3) had low reliability (Cronbach’s alpha=0.480). Because four roles 
are not mutually exclusive, each nonprofit organization has four values (ranging from 1 to 5) 
that account for roles of service provision, innovation, political advocacy, and social capital 
creation, respectively. The composite measure of multiple indicators for each role improves 
validity than use of single indicator with consideration of multiple attributes of each role.  
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CHAPTER 5 
DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
5.1 Nonprofit Contribution to Collaboration for Climate Change Adaptation 
5.1.1 Determinants of Nonprofit Contribution to Collaboration  
To identify factors influencing nonprofit contribution to collaboration, three models 
were analyzed. Model 1 employs eight main explanatory variables (i.e., Board size, 
Collaborative capacity, Government funding, Red tape, Social relationship, Social learning, and 
Demographic diversity, and Community support). Model 2 additionally includes control 
variables (i.e., Annual revenue and Organizational age) to Model 1. To see if the other model 
has a better fitness, I introduced Model 3 by adding a curvilinear term of Organizational age. 
The descriptive statistics for the independent variables was conducted, and the result is shown 
in Table 5.1.  
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables 
Predictor Observation Mean SD Min Max 
Board size 101 20.77 24.539 2 150 
Collaborative capacity 101 3.14 1.000 1 5 
Government funding 101 2.79 1.329 1 5 
Red tape 101 2.98 0.927 1 5 
Social relationship 101 3.81 0.784 1 5 
Social learning 101 3.82 0.963 1 5 
Demographic diversity 101 0.44 0.037 0.35 0.55 
Community support 101 4.07 0.697 3 5 
 
Multicollinearity and multivariate outliers were checked. Table 5.2 presents a result of 
multicollinearity. No multicollinearity was observed for Model 1 and Model 2 (i.e., all VIF values 
were less than 10). However, multicollinearity between linear term and quadric term of 
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Organizational age was detected in the Model 3 (i.e., VIF is 11.504 for linear term; 10.822 for 
squared term). It is not problematic because correlation between linear term and curvilinear 
term is commonly observed. There were no potential multivariate outliers in the three models.  
Table 5.2: Multicollinearity Statistics 
Predictor 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
Board size (small)a 0.702 1.424 0.695 1.439 0.694 1.441 
Board size (large)a 0.646 1.547 0.609 1.643 0.604 1.656 
Collaborative capacity 0.792 1.262 0.770 1.298 0.743 1.346 
Government funding 0.941 1.063 0.938 1.066 0.887 1.128 
Red tape 0.940 1.064 0.921 1.086 0.920 1.086 
Social relationship 0.747 1.338 0.741 1.349 0.725 1.379 
Social learning 0.600 1.667 0.587 1.703 0.587 1.704 
Demographic diversity 0.915 1.093 0.800 1.250 0.800 1.250 
Community support 0.630 1.587 0.629 1.590 0.623 1.605 
Annual revenue (logged)   0.838 1.193 0.822 1.216 
Organizational age    0.811 1.233 0.087 11.504 
(Organizational age)2     0.092 10.822 
 a. Medium is the reference group. 
I conducted the ordinary least square (OLS) regressions for the three models because 
distribution of Contribution to collaboration was close to normal distribution. Table 5.3 shows 
linear regression models for nonprofit contribution to collaboration. Model 3 best accounts for 
the relationship between nonprofit contribution level to collaboration and determinants (i.e., 
Adjusted R2=0.346). Thus, findings are discussed with the focus on the Model 3. Table 5.3 
reports that government funding, social relationship, annual revenue, and organizational age 
influence nonprofit contribution to collaboration for climate change adaptation. 
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Table 5.3: Linear Regression Models for Nonprofit Contribution to Collaboration 
Predictor 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
b β B β b Β 
Organizational Factors 
Board size (small)a - 0.085 - 0.055 - 0.120 - 0.076 - 0.131 - 0.084 
Board size (large)a - 0.191 - 0.148 - 0.174 - 0.135 - 0.198 - 0.153 
Collaborative capacity 0.040   0.062 0.065 0.100   0.042 0.065 
Government Factors 
Government funding 0.160*** 0.328 0.154*** 0.315 0.173*** 0.355 
Red tape - 0.016 - 0.022 - 0.032 - 0.045 - 0.033 - 0.048 
Interorganizational Factors 
Social relationship 0.296***   0.357 0.281*** 0.339 0.304*** 0.367 
Social learning 0.021 0.030 0.024 0.036 0.021   0.031 
Community Factors 
Demographic diversity - 0.434 - 0.025 0.486   0.028 0.410 0.024 
Community support 0.129 0.138 0.121   0.130 0.140 0.150 
Control Variables 
Annual revenue (logged)   0.195**   0.196 0.171* 0.171 
Organizational age   - 0.008 - 0.148   0.019 0.365 
(Organizational age)2     - 0.0005* - 0.527 
Constant 1.721*  - 0.004  - 0.161  
R2 0.355 0.399 0.425 
Adjusted R2 0.291 0.325 0.346 
Model F 5.555 5.373 5.413 
Model degree of freedom 91 89 88 
Note: N = 101; b = unstandardized regression coefficient; β = standardized regression coefficient. *p ≤ .1, **p ≤ .05, 
***p ≤ .01. a. Medium is the reference group. 
 
One finding is that government funding to nonprofit organizations tends to increase 
their contribution level to collaboration for climate change adaptation (i.e., b = 0.169, p ≤ 0.01), 
i.e., the result supports hypothesis 3. It has been widely known that, for nonprofit 
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organizations, receiving financial resources is a critical motivation to work with the 
government. The finding indicates that the financial support from governments extends the 
partner of nonprofit collaboration from the government to other sectors such as other 
nonprofit organizations and private organizations. Public funding increases financial stability of 
organizations, and thus nonprofit organizations with more public funding are capable of 
reducing collaboration costs (i.e., loss of autonomy and mission drift, etc.) than nonprofits with 
less government funding (Jang et al., 2016). 
Another finding is concerning the relationship between the social relationship and 
nonprofit contribution to collaboration. Hypothesis 5 is to test whether the existing 
relationships of nonprofit organizations with others promote the nonprofit organizations to 
contribute to collaborative governance for climate change adaptation. The prediction is 
supported. The positive and significant coefficient of the independent variable, social 
relationship, indicates that nonprofit organizations’ social ties with various organizations tend 
to increase level of contribution to collaboration for climate change adaptation (i.e., b = 0.297, 
p ≤ 0.01). This finding suggests that the routine interaction between organizations builds 
mutual trust and, in turn, facilitates collaboration to achieve common goals with less 
collaboration costs than co-works with new partners (Kwon & Feiock, 2010; LeRoux et al., 
2010).  
I do not find any statistical evidence of association between other independent variables 
(i.e., board size, collaborative capacity, perception of red tape, social learning, demographic 
diversity, and community support) and nonprofit contribution to collaboration. Even though 
board size does not have statistical significance, Table 5.3 reports that all the signs of coefficient 
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of small and large board are negative. The negative directions are maintained in the following 
regression analyses with only one exception (see Table 5.5). It needs to be noted that 
Hypothesis 1b (i.e., Nonprofits with large size of board are less likely to contribute to 
collaborative governance than nonprofits with medium size of board) is partly supported in the 
analysis for each component of the dependent variable. Details are addressed later.  
As for the control variables, I, interestingly, find that age of nonprofit organization has a 
nonlinear relationship with the nonprofit contribution to collaboration (i.e., b = - 0.0002, p ≤ 
0.05). The negative sign of quadratic term of organizational age suggests that the relationship 
between age of the nonprofit organization and collaboration level presents concave shape. 
However, because linear term of Organizational age does not have statistically significant 
coefficient, I cannot confirm the relationship. There are three possible cases. One possibility is 
that the level of nonprofit contribution to collaboration increases up to a certain age of the 
organization and then decreasing. Another possibility is that nonprofit contribution to 
collaboration declines with increasing slopes when the organizational age increases. In contrast, 
nonprofit organization’s contribution to collaboration might be decreasingly increased as the 
nonprofit organization gets older.     
It is also found that annual revenue of the nonprofit organization is positively associated 
with the degree of contribution to collaboration. Based on resource dependence theory, 
organizations with resource insufficiency are more likely to develop collaborative relationships 
with other organizations to receive or share resources. However, the finding of my dissertation 
is that nonprofit organizations with larger annual revenue tend to more contribute to 
collaboration for climate change adaptation than nonprofits with smaller annual revenue. An 
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explanation of the finding might be that nonprofits with small revenue could be discouraged 
from engaging in collaboration since they have higher risks of autonomy loss in the partnerships 
than large nonprofits (Guo & Acar, 2005). From the other perspective, the finding might be 
explained that large nonprofits are more attractive to the potential partners than small 
nonprofits because large resource implies higher possibility of resource sharing through the 
collaboration (Foster & Meinhard, 2002; Guo & Acar, 2005).  
5.1.2 Effects of Determinants on Each Component of the Nonprofit Contribution to 
Collaboration  
 
The contribution to collaboration was measured in terms of power, joint activities, 
human resource, funding, and information. To examine the influences of independent variables 
on each component of the dependent variable (i.e., Contribution to collaboration), descriptive 
analysis and the OLS regression analysis for five components of Contribution to collaboration 
were conducted. Table 5.4 presents descriptive statistics.  
Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics of the Contribution to Collaboration 
 Observation Mean SD Min Max 
Contribution to 
Collaboration 101 3.68 0.649 2.00 5.00 
Power 101 3.71 0.852 1 5 
Joint activities 101 4.00 0.812 1 5 
Human 
resource/expertise 101 3.32 1.095 1 5 
Funding 101 3.50 1.137 1 5 
Information 101 3.86 0.895 1 5 
 
In general, nonprofit organizations more frequently collaborate in terms of joint activities and 
information sharing than human resource sharing and financial resource transfer. More 
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specifically, nonprofit organizations often held campaigns together or develop legislative policy 
statements jointly (i.e., mean value of joint activities is 4.00). However, it is less frequent for 
nonprofits to provide/receive staffs and experts to/from other organizations for technical or 
administrative assistance of climate change adaptation than other collaborative activities (i.e., 
mean value of human resources/expertise is 3.32). 
The OLS regression for each component of the dependent variable provides some 
notable findings that are not observed in the previous analysis (compare Table 5.3 and Table 
5.5). First, as aforementioned, the prediction concerning the relationship between board size 
and nonprofit contribution to collaboration is partly supported. To test whether the board size 
of nonprofit organizations is associated with collaboration level (Hypothesis 1b), board size was 
categorized into small, medium, and large board, and medium-sized organization was a 
reference group. Despite no presence of significant coefficients of small board, Table 5.5 
reports that nonprofit organizations with large board are less likely to contribute to 
collaboration in terms of power sharing (i.e., setting goals and making decisions together) and 
information sharing than nonprofits with medium board (i.e., b = - 0.342, p ≤ 0.1 for power 
sharing; b = - 0.258, p ≤ 0.1 for information sharing). This finding empirically supports that 
nonprofit organizations with large board have difficulties in making collaboration decision due 
to disagreement among several board members (Aggarwal et al., 2012).   
Another finding is that collaborative capacity of the nonprofit organizations is positively 
associated with collaboration in terms of human resource (i.e., b = 0.244, p ≤ 0.05). That is 
Hypothesis 2 is supported. Based on resource dependence theory, organizations seek for 
sharing of staffs and experts due to insufficiency of the human resource. However, shortage of 
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the staffs or time to manage the collaborative relationship makes nonprofits hesitate to 
collaborate with others due to the risks of autonomy loss and mission drift (Gazley & Brudney, 
2007; Guo & Acar, 2005).  
There is an interesting finding concerning the relationship of social learning and 
collaboration. Social learning is positively associated with the information sharing but 
negatively associated with the collaboration in terms of funding (i.e., b = 0.539, p ≤ 0.01 for 
information sharing; b = - 0.229, p ≤ 0.1 for funding). My prediction is that nonprofit 
experiences of social learning tend to increase contribution to collaboration, i.e. in terms of 
both information and funding sharing (Hypothesis 6). The test result for funding contradicts the 
prediction whereas the prediction concerning information sharing is supported. It might be 
because trust fostered by social learning (i.e., competence trust) promotes information sharing, 
relatively discouraging funding sharing. According to Jiang et al. (2015), competence trust, 
which refers to rational evaluation of the other's abilities (Rempel et al., 1985) and is developed 
by learning, promotes sharing of intangible resources (e.g., knowledge and skills) rather than 
tangible resources (e.g., funds and equipment), but goodwill-based trust, which is strengthened 
by routine interaction, increases sharing of tangible resources rather than intangible resources. 
The finding suggests that mutual learning promotes knowledge sharing because it increases 
understanding of complexities of climate change and increases mutual trust in the 
organizational capacity of climate change adaptation. However, it is also suggested that mutual 
learning may have the effect of relatively restricting the sharing of funds that does not require 
complex knowledge or skills. 
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Table 5.5: Linear Regression Models for Each Components of the Contribution to Collaboration 
Predictor 
Unstandardized regression coefficient, b 
Power Joint Activities Human Resources Funding Information 
Organizational Factors 
Board size (small)a - 0.280 - 0.176 - 0.030 0.092 - 0.261 
Board size (large)a - 0.342* - 0.269 - 0.063 - 0.059 - 0.258* 
Collaborative capacity 0.027 - 0.055 0.244** - 0.074 0.069 
Government Factors 
Government funding 0.163** 0.038 0.281*** 0.309*** 0.075 
Red tape - 0.105 - 0.034 - 0.006 - 0.127 0.104 
Interorganizational Factors 
Social relationship 0.365*** 0.507*** 0.285* 0.231 0.130 
Social learning - 0.035 - 0.012 - 0.159 - 0.229* 0.539*** 
Community Factors 
Demographic diversity 2.452 - 4.879** 1.806 1.930 0.741 
Community support - 0.032  0.153 0.101 0.314* 0.162 
Control Variables 
Annual revenue (logged) 0.219* 0.202* - 0.125 0.508*** 0.050 
Organizational age 0.032 0.025 0.017 - 0.031 0.053*** 
(Organizational age)2 - 0.0008** - 0.0007** - 0.0004 0.0007 - 0.0013*** 
Constant - 0.443 2.253 1.009 - 2.640 - 0.984 
Adjusted R2 0.146 0.285 0.163 0.249 0.597 
Model F 2.422 4.324 2.628 3.756 13.349 
Note: N = 101; Model degree of freedom = 88; *p ≤ .1, **p ≤ .05, ***p ≤ .01. a. Medium is the reference group. 
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Table 5.5 also reports that demographic diversity of community negatively influences 
nonprofit contribution to collaboration of joint activities (i.e., b = - 4.879, p ≤ 0.05). That is, 
demographic diversity within community tends to decrease nonprofit collaboration level in 
terms of alliance activities such as campaign and making legislation (Hypothesis 7). In my 
dissertation, demographic diversity is measured based on age of community members. 
Preferences for climate change adaptation differ by age (ME, 2007). Nonprofit organizations in 
demographically diverse communities are struggling to fairly represent decentralized 
community interests (LeRoux & Carr, 2007), and, in turn, those nonprofits are less likely to work 
with others. It implies that nonprofit collaboration for climate change adaptation can be 
encouraged by creating processes for gathering the diverse opinions within the community and 
developing strategies to lead consensus. 
Community support is another factor that influences contribution to collaboration. It is 
empirically supported that community support tends to increase nonprofit contribution to 
collaboration in terms of funding (i.e., b = 0.314, p ≤ 0.1). For nonprofit organizations, program 
operation and financing are largely separated while, for business, provision of services is 
directly related to revenue (Foster et al., 2009). In the same sense, for nonprofits, the 
community is a marketplace (i.e., community members are clients of the nonprofit) and 
simultaneously an important source of funding (i.e., community members are donors of the 
nonprofit). Thus, nonprofit decision-making about operation of funds requires understanding of 
both client values and donor values. Furthermore, legitimacy and accountability are critical for 
nonprofits to achieve their mission, and they can be maintained based on the support of the 
communities in which the nonprofits serve.  
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Notably, the analysis for separate items of the dependent variable allows to infer the 
effect of organizational age on a certain part of collaboration, namely, information sharing. The 
coefficients of organizational age-related terms are statistically significant (i.e., b = 0.053, p ≤ 
0.01 for linear term; b = - 0.001, p ≤ 0.01 for squared term), which indicates that the level of 
nonprofit collaboration (i.e., information sharing) increases up to a certain age and then falling. 
It is inferred that nonprofit contribution to collaboration is maximized when the nonprofit 
organizations are about 21 years old. 
5.2 Nonprofit Roles in Climate Change Adaptation 
5.2.1 General Tendency of the Nonprofit Role   
To investigate what the roles of nonprofit organizations are in climate change 
adaptation, six types of nonprofit roles proposed by Moulton and Eckerd (2012) were 
measured, and four roles (i.e., service provision, innovation, political advocacy, and social 
capital creation) were finally identified through the factor analysis and reliability check 
(Cronbach’s alpha) (see Chapter 4). Because each organization can play multiple roles 
simultaneously with different levels for each role, data are analyzed in two ways. First, to see 
the overall statistical features of the nonprofit roles, all measured nonprofit role values (i.e., 
101 values for each role) were included in the descriptive statistics. Table 5.6 present the result. 
The social capital creation role has the highest mean value, but no clear dominance of one role 
over others was observed. Political advocacy role has the lowest mean value, and variability of 
the distribution is relatively higher than other roles.   
As an alternative, I included only the main role of each organization in the analysis to 
find out what role nonprofits mainly play in climate change adaptation. The main role of each 
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nonprofit was selected with the highest value among the four role values, that is, each 
organization represents only the main role. Then the frequency of each four roles selected as a 
main role was counted. If more than one role had the same maximum value, they were all 
counted. Considering only the main role(s) of each organization creates noticeable differences 
in frequency among the four nonprofit roles, and thus helping readers understand the 
characteristics of Korean nonprofit roles in climate change adaptation (Figure 5.1).  
Table 5.6: Descriptive Statistics of Nonprofit Roles 
Nonprofit Roles Observation Mean SD Min Max 
Service provision 101 3.61 0.612 2.00 5.00 
Innovation 101 3.65 0.637 2.33 5.00 
Political advocacy 101 3.23 0.785 1.00 5.00 
Social capital creation 101 3.70 0.638 2.00 5.00 
 
Figure 5.1: Frequency of the Nonprofit Roles in Climate Change Adaptation 
 
Note: Total frequency of the main roles is 131 since 20 and 7 nonprofit organizations have two and three main 
roles, respectively. Four organizations with the same values for all four roles were excluded in this analysis. 
 
The role of social capital creation is most frequently played among the Korean nonprofit 
organizations (i.e., 37%). Many nonprofit organizations are operated in the form of a coalition 
of central headquarters and regional offices. For example, the Korean Federation of 
106 
Environmental Movements, which consists of 54 regional offices, work jointly nationwide in 
some cases, and individually in other cases. Regional offices take various activities such as 
campaigns to reduce greenhouse gas emission and protect environment within the community. 
Those activities attract attention among local residents and mobilize community members, and 
thus finally raising a sense of community for climate change adaptation.  
Prevalence of social capital creation role in Korea might be explained by the culture of 
Korea. First, we-ness (Uri in Korean) is one of the key concepts that describe Korean culture. 
We-ness emphasizes community goals rather than individual interests, and values social 
relationships among members within the community (Yang, 2019). A sense of community is an 
important factor that motivates individuals to be willing to contribute to solving common 
problems or reaching community goals (Choi & Jeong, 2015).  
Also, it needs to be noted that the concept of social capital has been traditionally 
embedded in Korean society. As a representative example, from the 17th century to the early 
20th century, village-level joint labor groups called Dure were prevalently operated to jointly do 
agricultural tasks that required a lot of labor. This traditional activity is consistent with the 
social capital theory in that engaging in Dure is “an investment of personal resource” (i.e., labor 
force) based on “expected returns (p.19)” for the profit (Lin, 2001). In other words, Dure is a 
social asset that is created through the connection between community members and that 
each member can access. Understanding of the Korean culture suggests that forming a 
community on social issues and encouraging a sense of community among members has been 
effectively used to solve common problems in society. 
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As for the nonprofit role of political advocacy, various nonprofit organizations have 
worked to improve or develop policies for climate change adaptation. As a representative 
example, the Korea NGO’s Network has held policy discussions, seminars, and symposiums on 
energy-related issues such as the electricity rate system and energy voucher system. However, 
the result reports that the political advocacy role is least frequently played by Korean 
nonprofits (i.e., 14%). One possible explanation is that Korean nonprofit organizations are 
limited in their political advocacy function due to financial limitations. Since nonprofits in Korea 
are generally in poor financial condition and are dependent on the government funding (Park, 
2007). Public funding tends to reduce organizational autonomy (Jung & Moon, 2007). As a 
result, publicly funded nonprofits are less inclined to speak out about policy than financially 
independent nonprofits. Also, grassroots nonprofit organizations are more effective to 
understand civic preference in the community than large nonprofits, so they can serve as 
political advocates successfully (Hall, 2010; Park, 2007). However, many nonprofit organizations 
in Korea, especially environmental nonprofits, have centralized organizational structure.  
The other possibility is found in the characteristics of climate change adaptation 
policies. If a particular policy brings benefits (or costs) to the people as a whole, organized 
support (or resistance) does not arise as the impact of the policy is distributed throughout 
society. Conversely, if the impact of a particular policy is expected to be concentrated in 
particular interest groups, the interest groups systematically and strongly advocate (or deny) 
the policy (Wilson, 1984). Climate change policies tend to impose costs on the industrial sector 
in that they are mandatory (e.g., installation of cleanup facilities) and regulatory (e.g., limiting 
the use of fossil fuels). But benefits of the policies are not limited to the industrial sector but 
108 
distributed to the public. Thus, organizational resistance from the industry to the policy is 
expected, but the corresponding strong public support will not arise. When the conflict 
between stakeholder groups is considerable, nonprofit organizations are difficult to influence 
the policy formation process (Kim & Kim, 2004), that is, their role of policy advocacy reduces. 
5.2.2 Comparison of the Nonprofit Roles by Service Areas 
To examine whether there are any patterns in nonprofit roles by service areas, 
frequency of the main roles were compared for three nonprofit service areas informed in 
Chapter 4: (1) public safety and emergency management: disaster risk assessment, search and 
rescue, reliefs, rebuilding infrastructure, etc., (2) energy saving (recycling) and new/renewable 
energy development, and (3) natural resources conservation: conservation of species, nature 
conservation (river, ocean, and forest), etc. Main role(s) of each organization was(were) 
selected by the same procedure as the previous section. 
Figure 5.2: Comparison of Nonprofit Roles in Climate Change Adaptation by Service Areas 
 
 
In the previous part, it is found that the role of social capital creation is played the most 
by Korean nonprofit organizations, but that the political advocacy role is the least. Nonprofit 
organizations engaged in public safety and emergency management (Category 1) and 
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nonprofits working for conservation of natural resources (Category 3) have the same pattern. In 
other words, the role of social capital creation is the most frequent (i.e., 45% for category 1; 
42% for category 3), and the role of innovation is the second highest, followed by the role of 
service provision. The political advocacy role is the least frequent (i.e., 5% for category 1; 13% 
for category 3).  
However, nonprofit organizations working for energy saving and development (Category 
2) present a different pattern. Innovation role occupies the most (i.e., 33%), and the rest three 
roles have almost same portions with each other (i.e., 23% of social capital creation role, 
another 23% for political advocacy, and 21% of service provision). Possible explanations are 
found from the features of the field. The knowledge and technology related to energy saving 
and development of new or renewable energy change more dynamically than in other fields 
like disaster management and environment. Thus, new ideas and approaches differentiated 
from the existing ones are more required in nonprofit activities of technology development and 
dissemination. The recent policy trends in energy filed are another possible explanation. In 
recent years, relevant laws (e.g., Act on the Promotion of Development, Use, and Distribution of 
New and Renewable Energy and Act on the Promotion of Saving and Recycling of Resources) 
have been amended, and new policies are being promoted, such as creating an energy-
independent village, reorganizing electricity bills, and implementing an energy voucher system. 
It suggests that such a policy environment has relatively increased the role of policy advocates, 






6.1 Summary of Findings 
6.1.1 What Influences Nonprofit Contribution to Collaboration? 
The dissertation examines, based on the ICA framework, what influences nonprofit 
contribution to collaboration for climate change adaptation in South Korea. The effects of 
factors on nonprofit collaboration are examined in two ways. First, effects of explanatory 
variables on Contribution to collaboration, a composite of five indicators (power, joint activities, 
human resources, funding, and information), are analyzed (Analysis 1). Then, effects of 
explanatory variables on each of the five components of dependent variable are analyzed 
(Analysis 2). 
The first regression model of nonprofit collaboration (Analysis 1) reports some findings. 
First, government funding to nonprofit organizations has a positive effect on nonprofit 
collaboration. The finding suggests that, despite collaborative risks such as mission drift and 
loss of autonomy, the financial support of government is a critical motive for nonprofit 
collaboration, as public funds increase the financial stability of the organization. I also find the 
significant effect of social relationship on nonprofit collaboration. Existing interactions between 
nonprofit organizations and other organizations reinforce mutual trust (Ostrom, 2000) and 
reduce the cost of collaboration resulting from opportunism and shirking (Kwon & Feiock, 2010; 
LeRoux et al., 2010), and thus leading nonprofit organizations to more contribute to 
collaborative governance. 
Although the effects of organizational age and revenue size are not main interests of the 
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study, I find the two factors are associated with the nonprofit contribution to collaboration. Age 
of nonprofit organization has a nonlinear relationship with its collaboration level. Revenue has 
a significant effect on the degree of nonprofit collaboration. The finding suggests that the 
nonprofit organization with large revenue is encouraged to collaborate because financial 
advantage increases the likelihood of gaining an edge in partnerships (Guo & Acar, 2005).   
I do not find significant effects of other main predictors (i.e., board size, collaborative 
capacity, perception of red tape, social learning, demographic diversity, and community 
support) on nonprofit collaboration through Analysis 1. However, the analyses of relationships 
between predictors and each components of dependent variable (Analysis 2) report several 
findings. Board size has, in part, a significant effect on nonprofit collaboration in terms of power 
sharing and information sharing. Despite no evidence for small board, nonprofit organizations 
with large board are less likely to contribute to collaboration than nonprofits with medium-
sized board. The finding suggests that nonprofit organizations with large board have higher 
risks of disagreement in decision-making than nonprofits with medium board (Aggarwal et al., 
2012). 
Collaborative capacity is positively associated with human resource sharing. It suggests 
that nonprofit organizations with sufficient human resource are encouraged to collaborate as 
they can take the initiative in the relationship. Interestingly, social learning tends to increase 
information sharing but tends to decrease funding sharing. It might be attributed to the type of 
trust fostered by learning (i.e., competence trust). Competence trust, rational evaluation of the 
other's abilities, promotes sharing of intangible resources such as knowledge and skills rather 
than tangible resources like funds because sharing of intangible resources requires expertise 
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(Rempel et al., 1985). The finding suggests that mutual learning may encourage knowledge 
sharing, and thus relatively restricting funds sharing.   
The other finding is that demographic diversity of community is negatively associated 
with joint activities. It suggests that nonprofit organizations in demographically diverse 
communities are struggling to fairly represent decentralized community interests (LeRoux & 
Carr, 2007), and, in turn, those nonprofits are less likely to work with others. I also find that 
community support positively influences collaboration in terms of funding. For nonprofit 
organizations, community members are clients they serve and the source of funds. Thus, 
nonprofit decision-making concerning operation of funds requires understanding of both client 
values and donor values. It suggests that the support of community members as clients and 
donors facilitates the decision-making for funding sharing.  
6.1.2 What are the Nonprofit Roles in Climate Change Adaptation? 
The dissertation identifies Korean nonprofit roles in collaborative governance for 
climate change adaptation. Based on nonprofit role typology suggested by Moulton and Eckerd 
(2012), roles of service provision, innovation, political advocacy, and social capital creation are 
identified. In general, the role of social capital creation is observed most frequently, with the 
role of innovation being second, followed by the role of service delivery. The political advocacy 
role is least observed. One possible explanation of social capital creation role is that we-ness 
(Uri in Korean), which focuses community goals and social relationships with community 
members (Yang, 2019), is one of the key concepts describing Korean culture. Another 
explanation might be that the concept of social capital has been traditionally embedded in 
Korean society. It is representatively exemplified by a traditional labor group, Dure. Based on 
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expected returns on individual labor investment, Koreans carried out agricultural work jointly at 
the village level. The phrase, Sang Bu Sang Jo (相扶相助) stands for a key concept of the Korean 
culture of joint work based on social capital. Sang (相) means each other, and Bu (扶) and Jo (助) 
means helping. 
Concerning political advocacy role of Korean nonprofits, financial condition of the 
organizations might give an explanation. Many nonprofit organizations in Korea rely on 
government funding (Park, 2007), and thus being discouraged from giving voice to 
governments. It might be explained by the features of climate change policies as well. Since 
climate change policies are generally regulatory and mandatory, the policies cost industry but 
distribute benefits to the public. Thus, the industry is expected to resist systematically, but 
strong public support will not occur (Wilson, 1984). Strong conflicts between stakeholder 
groups hinder nonprofits from influencing the policy-making process (Kim & Kim, 2004). 
Nonprofit roles in different three service areas are compared. I find that nonprofit 
organizations working for energy saving and development present a different pattern from 
other two (i.e., emergency management and natural resource conservation). Innovation roles 
are the dominant, and the other three are observed in similar proportions. It might be due to 
the dynamics of the knowledge and technology involved, requiring more new ideas and 
approaches in the energy-related field. Considering the recent improvements in energy saving 
and development legislations and policies, it is also suggested that the policy environment 
surrounding energy sector has relatively increased the policy advocacy role of nonprofits in 
recent years. 
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6.2 Contribution to Scholarship and Practice  
The dissertation has theoretical and practical implications. First, this study contributes 
to the literature on interorganizational collaboration by considering contribution to 
collaboration. Despite abundant studies on collaboration among various entities, little research 
has addressed contribution to collaboration. Entering into collaboration (i.e., measured by a 
dichotomous variable) does not necessarily mean actually doing things necessary to achieve 
mutual goals successfully. I consider the level of collaboration in the different five aspects, 
namely, power, joint activities, human resources/experts, funding, and information. By 
considering actual contribution to achieving goals, this study provides insightful knowledge 
about interorganizational collaboration.  
The study also expands the institutional collective action framework to understanding 
the nonprofit collaboration. With a notable exception (Jang et al., 2016), existing literature 
using the ICA framework focus on explaining collaboration of local governments (Andrew, Jung, 
et al., 2015; Feiock, 2009; Hawkins & Andrew, 2010; Kwon & Feiock, 2010; Tavares & Feiock, 
2014). In understanding why nonprofit organizations contribute to collaboration, it is important 
to identify collaborative benefits and risks that nonprofit organizations expect. This research 
sheds light on identifying determinants of nonprofit contribution to collaboration by applying 
the ICA framework to the mechanism of overcoming collective action problems that nonprofit 
organizations engage.  
The dissertation contributes to scholarship of the nonprofit roles by comparing the 
three typologies of nonprofit role and empirically identifying nonprofit roles in collaborative 
governance. Scholars have conducted empirical studies on a specific nonprofit role (Child & 
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Grønbjerg, 2007; LeRoux, 2007, 2009; McDonald, 2007; Mosley, 2010), but few studies, except 
for Moulton and Eckerd (2012), have empirically analyzed multiple roles of nonprofit 
organizations simultaneously. Based on Moulton and Eckerd’s work (2012), this dissertation 
identifies that Korean nonprofits mainly function as social capital creators in collaborative 
governance for climate change adaptation, while having the least role in political advocacy. 
Also, by comparing nonprofit roles by service area, the study empirically demonstrates that the 
main role of nonprofit organizations differs among nonprofit services areas. 
Practically, categorized determinants of nonprofit collaboration employed in this 
research strengthen nonprofit contribution in collaborative governance. The study employs 
eight factors that fall into four categories (i.e., organizational, government, interorganizational, 
and community factors), and then identifies what factors influence nonprofit collaboration in 
terms of power, joint activities, human resources/experts, funding, and information sharing. 
Practitioners can develop balanced strategies that promote nonprofits to co-work effectively, 
taking into account the internal and external environmental factors of nonprofit organizations. 
6.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Study 
Despite contribution to academia and practice, the dissertation has three major 
limitations. In this part, limitations of the study are described. Then, based on the limitations, I 
make suggestions for future study.  
First, the study has a limitation associated with operationalization of the dependent 
variable (i.e., Contribution to collaboration). The level of collaboration was measured based on 
respondents’ perceptions of collaboration in terms of power, joint activities, human resources, 
funds, and information. Despite its common utilization, measurements with the individual 
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perception may not capture actual collaboration level. There is a possibility that some 
responses are influenced by personal values and experiences. Also, individual expertise on the 
organization may influence the perception of collaboration level even though staffs savvy about 
the organizations’ activities (i.e., president, board members, executive directors, or equivalent 
staffs) participate to the survey. To minimize the impact of individual perception on the 
collaboration level, I give two suggestions for the future study. First, future research can 
measure the level of collaboration utilizing objective measures (e.g., official documents, 
frequency of joint activities, number of shared employees, amount of shared funds). Also, 
future study can use mean value of the level of collaboration perceived by two or three 
respondents for each organization. 
Second, operationalization of nonprofit roles in South Korea using survey instruments 
developed in different culture may have a limitation in generalization of the findings. The 
dissertation utilizes survey items proposed by Moulton and Eckerd (2012). Despite the 
advantage of existing study in ensuring validity, there may be biases or errors due to cultural 
differences between the two countries. I intended to identify six different roles of nonprofit 
(i.e., service delivery, innovation, individual expression, political advocacy, citizen participation, 
and social capital creation) but failed to identify all six. Only four roles were identified except 
for individual expression and citizen participation. Korean culture emphasizes we relatively 
more than I, compared to Western culture. For the reason, participation in the nonprofit sector 
may be perceived with more association with creating public interests within a community (i.e. 
creating social capital) than expressing individual values and beliefs. Thus, future study is 
suggested to conduct the comparative analysis of nonprofit roles in Asian country and Western 
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country. Comparative studies can help us understand the commonalities and differences of 
nonprofit roles across countries in different cultures. Furthermore, comparative studies can 
contribute to developing survey indicators for nonprofit roles that are more generally 
applicable to countries in different cultures. 
Third, small sample size of the survey may limit the generalization of the findings. Due 
to the low accessibility to the nonprofit organizations, final number of observations applied to 
the regression analysis to investigate determinants of nonprofit collaboration and nonprofit 
roles in collaborative governance is 101. Small sample size might result in under-
representativeness of a certain subgroup within a population while large sample size increases 
validity of the inferred causal relationship. To address this limitation, future studies can conduct 
in-depth interviews as a complementary research tool to the survey. In-depth interviews can 
help us understand the mechanisms that lead nonprofit organizations to collaborate, which are 




This survey is designed to collect information on nonprofit collaboration with other 
organizations for climate change adaptation. All information provided will be kept strictly 
confidential and will only be used for research purpose.  
PART Ⅰ. 
1. The government has been pursuing climate change adaptation measures with the main
contents of reducing disaster risk due to climate change, energy saving and renewable energy
development, and natural environment conservation. In which of the following areas does your
organization primarily engage?
□ Public safety and emergency management: disaster risk assessment, search and rescue,
reliefs, rebuilding infrastructure, etc.
□ Energy-related: energy saving (recycling) and new/renewable energy development, etc.
□ Natural resources conservation: conservation of species, nature conservation (river,
ocean, and forest), etc. 
□ Others (  ) 
2. Which of the following organizations is your organization registered to? (Circle one)
□ Central government agencies
□ Si (Special Metropolitan City, Metropolitan Autonomous City, and Metropolitan City).
□ Do (including Special Self-Governing Province)
3. Where is your organization located? (Please answer by city/gun/gu)
 A 
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4. In which of the following areas are the services provided by your organization available?
(Circle one)
□ Nationwide
□ Si/Do (  ) 
□ Si/Gun/Gu (  ) 
5. How many members does your organization have in board of directors (or its equivalents)?
 a 
6. How many full-time employees does your organization have? (please include all paid staffs
and volunteers)                                a
7. How much is your organization’s annual revenue in fiscal year 2019?
 A 




1. To what extent do you agree about following statements describing collaboration of your
organization with other organizations for climate change adaptation? (Other organizations





1  2  3  4  5 
1-1. My organization works together with other
organizations to set goals or make decisions. □ □ □ □  □ 
1-2. My organization engages in various joint
activities for climate change adaption (e.g.,
conference, campaign, developing legislative
policy statements, etc.).
□ □ □ □  □
1-3. My organization provides and receives staffs or
experts to support activities for climate change
adaptation (e.g., technical or administrative
assistance).
□ □ □ □  □
1-4. My organization makes investment, donation, or
fundraising for climate change adaption. □ □ □ □  □
1-5. My organization develops data and shares
information for climate change adaptation with
other organizations (e.g., sharing best practice,
opening data to other organizations or the public,
etc.).
□ □ □ □ □
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1  2  3  4  5 
2. My organization has sufficient staff and time to
manage the collaborative relationship. □ □ □ □  □ 
3. My organization has engaged in programs funded
by governments (at all levels). □ □ □ □  □
4. Regulations, rules, and administrative procedures
of the government constrain activities of my
organization.
□ □ □ □  □ 
5. My organization has maintained formal/informal
relationships with other organizations, i.e.,
government agencies, nonprofits, and private
sector.
□ □ □ □  □
6. My organization enhances understanding of
climate change adaptation and acquires
knowledge by participating in learning programs
such as conferences and seminars.
□ □ □ □  □
7. Activities of my organization are supported by
community. □ □ □ □ □
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PART Ⅲ. 












1  2  3  4  5 
1-1. My organization promotes a sense of community
among our users/clients. □ □ □ □  □ 
1-2. My organization brings together people of
different political/economic backgrounds through
our programs/services.
□ □ □ □  □ 
1-3. My organization provides a place for people to
socialize or feel a sense of belonging. □ □ □ □  □
1-4. My organization participates in or promotes
voter education and participation. □ □ □ □  □ 
1-5. My organization participates in/promotes public
education campaigns. □ □ □ □  □
1-6. My organization organizes community around
social issues. □ □ □ □  □ 
1-7. My organization participates in government
committees or commissions. □ □ □ □  □
1-8. My organization meets with public officials and
staff; providing testimony on policy issues. □ □ □ □  □ 
1-9. My organization participates in coalitions with
other organizations for the purpose of influencing
policy.












1  2  3  4  5 
1-10. My organization tries out new ideas and
approaches to programs/services. □ □ □ □  □
1-11. My organization provides programs/services
that have not been provided before in this
community.
□ □ □ □  □ 
1-12. My organization serves users/clients that have
not targeted before for our types of
services/programs.
□ □ □ □  □ 
1-13. My organization meets an unmet need for a
particular type of program/service in our
community.
□ □ □ □  □ 
1-14. My organization provides high-quality
programs/services. □ □ □ □  □ 
1-15. My organization provides cost-efficient
programs/services. □ □ □ □  □ 
1-16. My organization provides a vehicle for private
donors to express their values through our
programs/services.
□ □ □ □  □ 
1-17. My organization supports for staffs to express
their faith through work. □ □ □ □  □ 
1-18. My organization engages volunteers in critical
activities within the organization. □ □ □ □ □
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Part Ⅳ. 
Job Title:         persons 
Gender:        □ Male         □ Female
How many years have you worked in nonprofit organizations? (If you have worked in two or 
more nonprofit organizations, please add all experiences.)                                a 
Thank you for your help, 
Ji Sun Ryu (Ph.D. Student) 
Department of Public Administration 
University of North Texas  
1155 Union Circle #310617 
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